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I. INTRODUCTION: TWO LOUISIANA STORIES—RACE, INEQUALITY,  
AND RHETORIC 
The televised images of the plight of Hurricane Katrina survivors 
sparked a national conversation concerning the salience of race in 
contemporary United States social policy and group experience. Given the 
anticipated ferocity of the storm, commentators debated why local and 
national governmental officials failed adequately to evacuate the city’s 
most vulnerable citizens.1 The public discourse surrounding Hurricane 
Katrina exposed a deep perceptual gap regarding the relevance of race 
among blacks and whites. Opinion data, for example, demonstrate that 
blacks and whites disagree on whether racial insensitivity impacted 
President Bush’s inadequate response to the plight of the survivors.2 While 
 
 
 1. PEW RESEARCH CTR., HUGE RACIAL DIVIDE OVER KATRINA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: TWO-
IN-THREE CRITICAL OF BUSH’S RELIEF EFFORTS 2 (2005) [hereinafter HUGE RACIAL DIVIDE] 
(reporting findings of opinion poll showing that a majority of Americans believe federal and local 
officials responded inadequately to the storm); Scott Shane, After Failures, Government Officials Play 
Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004, at A2.  
 2. See generally HUGE RACIAL DIVIDE, supra note 1; Lydia Saad, Blacks Blast Bush for 
Katrina Response: Most Believe Racism Was Responsible for Delays in Providing Relief, GALLUP 
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 14, 2005, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/18526/Blacks-Blast-Bush-
Katrina-Response.aspx [hereinafter Blacks Blast Bush]. 
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blacks attributed the treatment and vulnerability of Katrina victims to their 
race, whites commonly dismissed racial explanations.3 This division over 
the significance of race did not originate with Hurricane Katrina. Instead, 
an abundance of statistical data consistently demonstrates that persons of 
color tend to believe that racism remains a substantial barrier to their 
social and economic advancement, while whites tend to dismiss racial 
status as a contemporary marker of disadvantage and privilege.4 These 
data suggest that whites have, in fact, grown frustrated with ongoing 
claims of racial injustice. Whites are more likely to believe that the United 
States has transcended racism, and they often endeavor to explain racially 
identifiable inequity as a product of nonracial variables such as class 
inequality, a culture of poverty, or lack of initiative.5 Persons of color, by 
contrast, attribute social and economic disparities that correlate with race 
to past and ongoing injustice.6 
In the public debates surrounding Hurricane Katrina, two individuals 
became popular icons of these binary views on the salience of race. Kanye 
West, a popular music vocalist, advocated a “racial” explanation when, 
during a televised fundraiser for Hurricane Katrina survivors, he nervously 
proclaimed that “George Bush doesn’t care about black people.”7 
Defending her husband and promoting the deracialized viewpoint, Laura 
Bush dismissed racial explanations for the federal response as “disgusting” 
and assured the public that President Bush “cares about everyone in our 
country.”8 Although she discounted race as a variable shaping the 
vulnerability of Hurricane Katrina survivors, Laura Bush embraced other 
 
 
 3. See HUGE RACIAL DIVIDE, supra note 1, at 3 (reporting dramatic differences in opinion 
among whites and blacks regarding the centrality of race in the plight of Katrina victims); Saad, supra 
note 2, at 1–3 (same). 
 4. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., OPTIMISM ABOUT BLACK PROGRESS DECLINES: BLACKS SEE 
GROWING VALUES GAP BETWEEN POOR AND MIDDLE CLASS 8 (2007) [hereinafter OPTIMISM ABOUT 
BLACK PROGRESS] (reporting dramatic disparities among whites and blacks concerning the existence 
of racism in the United States); Jeffrey M. Jones, Whites, Blacks, Hispanics Disagree About Way 
Minority Groups Treated, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, July 11, 2006, available at http://www.gallup.com/ 
poll/23629/Whites-Blacks-Hispanics-Disagree-About-Way-Minority-Groups-Treated.aspx (reporting 
dramatic disparities among whites, blacks, Asian Americans and Latinos concerning the perceived 
mistreatment of persons of color); Poll: Most Americans See Lingering Racism—In Others, Dec. 12, 
2006, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/12/12/racism.poll/index.html (reporting dramatic 
disparities among whites and blacks concerning the existence of racism in the United States). 
 5. See OPTIMISM ABOUT BLACK PROGRESS, supra note 4, at 8 (reporting that whites are more 
likely than blacks or Latinos to blame blacks for their unequal status). 
 6. Id. 
 7. John M. Broder, Amid Criticism of Federal Efforts, Charges of Racism Are Lodged, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A10. 
 8. Peter Baker, FEMA Director Replaced as Head of Relief Effort, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2005, 
at A17. 
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structural reasons for their condition, including poverty: “I do think . . . 
that poor people were more vulnerable. They live in poor neighborhoods; 
their neighborhoods were the ones that were more likely to flood . . . . 
Their housing was more vulnerable, and that’s what we saw and that’s 
what we want to address in our country.”9 Other commentators contributed 
to both sides of the explosive public discourse. Conservative commentator 
Bill O’Reilly blamed the people of New Orleans for the situation using 
racially and class-tinged language. He observed that “if you become 
addicted, if you live a gangsta-life, you will be poor and powerless just 
like many of those in New Orleans.”10 Echoing this sentiment, Pat 
Buchanan decried, “the character and conduct” of Hurricane Katrina 
survivors, who “waited for the government to come save them” and 
“screamed into the cameras for help.”11 O’Reilly and Buchanan rejected 
racial inequality or class vulnerability as possible factors explaining the 
status of Hurricane Katrina victims and instead asserted that their own 
pathological behavior created their harm.12 Antiracists, however, 
maintained that conjoined racism and poverty made New Orleans’s blacks 
more susceptible to the hurricane and that these factors also shaped the 
inadequate governmental preparation for and responsiveness to the dire 
situation.13 
More than a century before Hurricane Katrina, blacks in Louisiana 
occupied the center of another destructive storm that similarly captured 
media attention and provoked a national debate concerning racial justice. 
The Colfax Massacre occurred in 1873 after heavily contested state and 
local elections that pitted black and white Republicans against an entirely 
white and anti-Reconstruction Democratic party.14 The Colfax Massacre 
represents an extreme version of the racial terrorism blacks faced as they 
attempted to exercise newly obtained political rights. After the Republican 
governor dispatched a “black unit” of the state militia to prevent white 
Democrats from forcibly taking control of the Colfax local government, a 
large group of heavily armed whites stormed the town and slaughtered 280 
 
 
 9. First Lady: Charges That Racism Slowed Aid ‘Disgusting,’ CNN, Sept. 8, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/08/katrina.laurabush/index.html. 
 10. Bill O’Reilly, Government Can’t Protect Us: Part Two, FOX NEWS, Sept. 8, 2005, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,168777,00.html. 
 11. Patrick J. Buchanan, Failure of an Idea . . . and a People, WORLD NET DAILY, Sept. 14, 
2005, http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=32332. 
 12. See Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in 
America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 462–69 (2006) (discussing public discourse that blamed 
Katrina victims for their plight). 
 13. Id. at 451–53 (discussing class and race status of Katrina victims). 
 14. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED RESOLUTION 437 (1988). 
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blacks.15 During the violence, whites chased blacks into the county 
courthouse, set it afire, and shot those who attempted to escape.16 Fifty 
individuals emerged from the building displaying a white flag, and the 
crowd executed them.17 
The Justice Department responded to the situation and secured 
indictments for ninety-seven individuals; only three were convicted.18 In 
United States v. Cruikshank,19 a case that many commentators argue 
helped solidify the demise of Congress’s power over Reconstruction,20 the 
Supreme Court reversed the convictions.21 Although the historical context 
of the bloodshed and criminal complaint’s description of the racial identity 
of the victims and the assailants clearly demonstrate the operative value of 
race to the conflict, the Supreme Court nevertheless dismissed several 
counts against the defendants on multiple grounds, including the fact that 
the prosecutors failed to explicitly allege that defendants acted out of 
racial hostility, which the opinion construed as a necessary element of the 
crime of conspiring to deprive blacks of the right to vote.22 The Court was 
unwilling to see race despite the centrality of race in Southern election-
related violence during and after Reconstruction, and the factual 
allegations in the criminal complaint that supported a finding of race-
based hostility.23 Despite this racialized historical setting, the Court held 
that “it does not appear in these counts that the intent of the defendants 
was to prevent these parties from exercising their right to vote on account 
of their race . . . . We may suspect that race was the cause of the hostility; 
 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See ROBERT KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL 
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866–1876, at 176–78 (1985). 
 19. 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
 20. See Benno C. Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the 
Progressive Era, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 835, 840 (1982) (arguing that Cruikshank “left the right to vote 
in state elections in the grip of terror, at least so far as federal law was concerned”); see also Ellen D. 
Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341, 2350 n.54 (2003) (listing an 
abundance of scholarship that stands for the proposition that Cruikshank and other case law “thwarted 
federal power to protect the southern black population and facilitated the end of Reconstruction”). 
 21. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 542. 
 22. Id. at 556. 
 23. See Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal 
Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2113, 2155 n.168 (1993) (arguing that “the racial basis for the 
actions taken by the Cruikshank defendants could hardly have been clearer.”); see also I. Bennett 
Capers, On Justitia, Race, Gender and Blindness, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 203, 226 n.110 (2006) 
(arguing that in Cruikshank, the Court “reversed the[] conviction[s] on a variety of grounds, including 
the technicality that the indictment, though describing the racial identities of the parties involved, had 
failed to explicitly allege that the violence was motivated by race”). 
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but it is not so averred.”24 Through “sterile formalism,”25 the Justices 
obfuscated the salience of race in one of the most graphically racist set of 
facts ever to reach the Court.26 As early as Reconstruction, the Court 
callously denied blacks’ racial injuries. This decision, along with a series 
of rulings from the Court, would severely undermine federal enforcement 
of political and social equality for emancipated blacks.27  
Following the demise of Reconstruction, the Court would formalize its 
disdain for antiracist legislation. In the Civil Rights Cases,28 which 
invalidated a Reconstruction-era federal law that prohibited racial 
discrimination in places of public accommodation, the Court opined that 
the time had now come for blacks, who had “shaken off” the impact of 
slavery, to become “mere citizen[s],” rather than “special favorite[s] of the 
law.”29 Less than two decades after the ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, when blacks exercised constitutional liberties under the 
threat of extreme violence, the Court believed that Congress had provided 
excessive remedies for racial injustice. The Court, echoing popular 
opinion, had reached a point of racial exhaustion.  
This Article examines historical and contemporary race discourse 
contained in political and juridical sources in order to illustrate how 
opponents to racial egalitarian measures have frequently contested such 
policies on the grounds that they are redundant, unnecessary, or too 
burdensome or taxing. Racial exhaustion rhetoric has operated as a 
persistent discursive instrument utilized to contest claims of racial 
injustice and to resist the enactment of racial egalitarian legislation. Racial 
exhaustion rhetoric has enjoyed particular force during and immediately 
following periods of mass political mobilization by antiracist social 
movements and institutional political actors, and it retains potency in 
contemporary racial discourse. Although this Article conducts a cross-
historical analysis of debates over racial justice policy, it does not rest on 
 
 
 24. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added). 
 25. See DeShaney v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 212 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 26. See TED TUNNELL, THE CRUCIBLE OF RECONSTRUCTION: WAR, RADICALISM, AND RACE IN 
LOUISIANA 1862–1877, at 192 (1984) (“The massacre at Colfax courthouse ranks as the worst single 
day of carnage in the history of Reconstruction . . . .”); Lawrence, supra note 23, at 2155 n.168; David 
Dante Troutt, Screws, Koons, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional Narratives in Federal 
Police Brutality Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18, 58 n.123 (1999) (arguing that Cruikshank’s 
“blindness to factual context is alarming”); Note, Congressional Power Under the Civil War 
Amendments, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1247, 1258 (observing that in Cruikshank, the indictment failed for a 
specific allegation of racial intent based on “race even though the facts of the case revealed a most 
heinous racial crime”).  
 27. See Katz, supra note 20, at 2350 n.54 (citing numerous sources that support this proposition). 
 28. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 29. Id. at 25. 
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the idea that racial discourse has retained a static quality over time.30 
Indeed, innumerable historical factors have contributed both to the 
evolution of racial status and to the content of race-equality discourse. 
Despite the contingent nature of language and identity, however, 
opponents to racial equality measures have historically discounted the 
ongoing relevance of race and have depicted demands for civil rights 
remedies as vexatious and injurious to whites. The pervasive deployment 
of this narrative has important implications for participants in antiracist 
social movements, civil rights scholars and attorneys, and judicial scholars 
who wish to understand the impact of political rhetoric upon doctrine. 
This Article proceeds in three principle parts. Part II explains the role 
of rhetoric and narratives in shaping commonly held societal beliefs and 
argues that racial exhaustion discourse functions as a social script that 
seeks to portray the United States as a post-racist society. Part II then 
summarizes the basic content of racial exhaustion rhetoric and identifies 
five common arguments that have endured across historical contexts, 
which depict race-based remedies as redundant, taxing, injurious to 
whites, special handouts to blacks, and futile because law cannot alter 
racial inequality. Next, Part II examines the political rhetoric employed by 
nineteenth-century Congressional opponents to Reconstruction and by the 
Supreme Court in order to illustrate the usage of racial exhaustion 
discourse as an early rhetorical instrument to contest race-based remedies 
and claims of racial injustice. Part III analyzes domestic and international 
factors that created political opportunities for the successful advocacy of 
progressive racial policies after World War I, during World War II, and in 
the subsequent Cold War era. Part III then demonstrates that, despite the 
changing political conditions that promoted progress in United States race 
relations, opponents of racial egalitarianism during these historical 
moments dismissed race-based remedies as excessive and unfair. Finally, 
Part III examines the deployment of racial exhaustion rhetoric in 
contemporary political and juridical discourse in order to situate current 
usage of this rhetoric within a broader historical context. Part IV considers 
how racial exhaustion rhetoric hinders political opportunities for antiracist 
social movements. Given the pervasive and persistent belief that the 
United States has transcended racial inequality, antiracist social 
 
 
 30. Stephen M. Feldman, The Persistence of Power and the Struggle for Dialogic Standards in 
Postmodern Constitutional Jurisprudence: Michelman, Habermas, and Civic Republicanism, 81 GEO. 
L.J. 2243, 2277 (1993) (“Postmodern theorists realize that our forms of thought and action are 
historically and culturally contingent and that those forms constantly regenerate themselves through 
our own words, thoughts, and actions.”). 
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movements may have to reframe some of their agendas in race-neutral 
terms, including the advocacy of class-based remedies. Such a decision 
risks artificially conflating the experiences of poor persons across racial 
and gender lines, and it could generate political opposition which depicts 
antipoverty policies as special handouts to undeserving individuals, in 
particular persons of color. Nevertheless, successful antiracist political 
mobilization and legal arguments might require that social movements 
contest the premises of racial exhaustion rhetoric while simultaneously 
laboring within its confines. 
II. NINETEENTH-CENTURY RACIAL DISCOURSE 
A. Racial Exhaustion: An American Narrative 
1. Narratives and Society 
Social narratives seek to cohere sequences of important cultural and 
political events.31 They perform a vital function because they permit 
societies to make sense of and to convey understanding about 
contemporary and historical experiences.32 As such, narratives serve a 
macro-social role: they allow groups of individuals to unify around a set of 
shared experience and beliefs.33 To accept the premise of a “collective 
narrative,” the listener must believe that the story accurately conveys 
information concerning the broader social landscape in which the 
individual exists.34  
Sociologists who study language and narrative theory have analyzed 
narratives constructed by dominant social groups.35 Dominant group 
narratives, like all collective narratives, attempt to explain social events 
and conditions. With respect to power-based inequity, sociologists have 
observed that dominant group members often legitimize inequality by 
attributing group disparities to individual shortcomings instead of 
 
 
 31. Larry J. Griffin, Narrative, Event-Structure Analysis, and Causal Interpretation in Historical 
Sociology, 98 AM. J. SOC. 1094, 1097 (1993). 
 32. Id. at 1099 (“Narrative therefore permits a form of sequential causation that allows for 
twisting, varied, and heterogeneous time paths to a particular outcome.”). 
 33. See Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Amanda Lewis & David G. Embrick, “I Did Not Get That Job 
Because of a Black Man . . .”: The Story Lines and Testimonies of Color-Blind Racism, 19 SOC. 
FORUM 555, 556 (2004) (“Stories are not only central to narrating our individual lives but to social 
relations.”). 
 34. Id. at 575. 
 35. Id. at 556 (“Storytelling most often reproduces power relations, as the specific stories we tell 
tend to reinforce the social order.”) (citation omitted). 
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domination or bias.36 As such, dominant narratives concerning social 
relations attempt to “naturalize” uneven distributions of economic and 
political power.37 
Social movements,38 like individuals and groups, also rely on rhetoric 
and narratives to articulate shared social and political perspectives. Social 
movement “frames” organize the movement’s objectives and activities 
around an articulable political message.39 As social movement theorists 
have observed: “[F]rames are constructed . . . as movement adherents 
negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic condition or 
situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding 
who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and 
urge others to act in concert to affect change.”40 Similarly, by engaging 
social movement actors and the electorate, politicians utilize framing to 
present policy initiatives in a manner that generates political support.41 
2. Social Narratives on Race 
The concept of social or collective narratives provides a useful lens for 
examining racial equality discourse because social movements, political 
actors, and social groups shape public policy, public opinion, and Supreme 
Court doctrine surrounding race and racial justice.42 Although many 
 
 
 36. See Lawrence D. Bobo, Prejudice as a Group Position: Microfoundations of a Sociological 
Approach to Racism and Race Relations, 55 J. SOC. ISSUES 445, 464 (1999) (discussing current racist 
ideology which “involves persistent negative stereotyping of Black Americans, a tendency to blame 
Blacks themselves for the Black-White gap in socioeconomic standing, and resistance to meaningful 
policy efforts to ameliorate America’s racist social conditions and practices.”). 
 37. See Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Racial Attitudes or Racial Ideology? An Alternative Paradigm for 
Examining Actors’ Racial Views, 8 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 63, 70 (2003) (discussing “whites’ 
naturalization of race-related matters” or the effort to “normalize events or actions that could otherwise 
be interpreted as racist”). 
 38. Sociologists and political scientists define a “social movement” as “a purposive and 
collective attempt of a number of people to change individuals or societal institutions and structures.” 
Mayer N. Zald & Roberta Ash, Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change, 44 SOC. 
FORCES 327, 329 (1965). 
 39. Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An 
Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 611, 615 (2000). 
 40. Id.  
 41. See William G. Jacoby, Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending, 44 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 750 (2000) (observing that “politicians will attempt to define, or ‘frame,’ issues in ways 
that maximize support for their own positions”). 
 42. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 424–59 (2001) (discussing the role of law in fortifying social movement 
activity in antiracist, feminist, and gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender contexts); Reva B. Siegel, 
Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
297, 300–01 (2001) (discussing social movement, public opinion, and coordinate branch influence on 
constitutional law). 
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historians rightfully caution against essentializing the meaning of language 
and political rhetoric employed across historical moments,43 opponents to 
racial justice measures have frequently contested such policies with a 
strikingly consistent discourse that depicts racial remedies as redundant, 
unnecessary, vexatious, futile, and unfair to whites. This rhetoric of racial 
exhaustion contends that persons of color (most often blacks) have 
benefitted from a protracted and costly social project that has defeated and 
adequately remedied racism. Accordingly, any lingering social and 
economic inequality that corresponds with racial status results from 
nonracial factors such as poverty, individual pathology, or lack of merit. 
Racial exhaustion rhetoric depicts the United States as a post-racist society 
that rationally views claims of racial injustice and demands for remedial 
state action with suspicion.44 
3. Particulars of Racial Exhaustion  
Opponents of racial egalitarian initiatives have portrayed such policies 
as redundant and overly burdensome by relying upon a series of distinct, 
yet related, claims about the status of United States race relations. 
Collectively, these arguments seek to disprove the necessity, fairness or 
efficacy of policies designed to ameliorate racial inequity. Historically, the 
following assertions have often framed political resistance to racially 
egalitarian legal enactments: 
• The United States has already waged a sustained, taxing, 
and successful battle against racism, thus obviating the 
need for remedial state action; 
 
 
 43. On the debates among historians concerning the relevance of language, history and 
postmodernism, see Neville Kirk, History, Language, Ideas and Post-modernism: A Materialist View, 
19 SOC. HIST. 221 (1994). 
 44. Other scholars have considered this argument from a contemporary perspective and have 
argued that a new racism exists, which, unlike Jim Crow and slavery, does not rest on blatant and overt 
white supremacist notions, but upon the belief that persons of color have equal opportunity and simply 
lack initiative and that lawmakers need not implement racially egalitarian remedies. See, e.g., Colin 
Wayne Leach, Against the Notion of a “New Racism,” 15 J. COMMUNITY & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 
432, 439 (2005) (discussing “new racism” theories). Other scholars have made similar claims using 
different terminology. See Bobo, supra note 36, at 464 (analyzing “laissez-faire racism”); Bonilla-
Silva, supra note 37, at 68 (discussing “colour blind racism”). This Article, however, complicates the 
claim that white depictions of the United States as post-racial is a new development. Instead, this 
argument has arisen in debates over racial justice as early as Reconstruction. See infra text 
accompanying notes 48–130. Cf. Leach, supra, at 434 (complicating notion that “‘new racism’” is 
“new”). 
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• State actors should avoid excessive, burdensome, or 
redundant attention to race by placing rigid time or 
substantive limitations around remedies for racial 
inequality; 
• State actors should decline to address racial inequality 
because the law cannot alter race relations, and efforts to 
utilize law in this fashion would waste societal resources; 
• Because race no longer remains a significant barrier to 
economic advancement, any ongoing material inequality 
between whites and persons of color results from nonracial 
factors, such as poverty or individual merit; and 
• Race-based remedies harm and alienate innocent whites 
and give blacks a special or preferential status.45 
Opponents to racial egalitarianism have frequently utilized these 
arguments in order to portray the United States as a post-racist society, 
resist race-based remedies as taxing or futile, and portray claims of racial 
injustice as false and opportunistic. Some contemporary sociologists have 
analyzed similar dominant claims concerning the status of domestic race 
relations, but have concluded that depictions of the United States as a post-
racist society only emerged following the Civil Rights Movement as a 
result of a concerted political effort to resist the implementation of policies 
such as affirmative action and the formal dismantling of Jim Crow.46 This 
“new racism” approach severely distorts the historical content of racial 
discourse and undervalues the endurance of racial exhaustion discourse in 
arguments contesting racial progress.47 These scholars’ failure to conduct a 
more comprehensive and historical analysis of racial discourse, as set forth 
in this Article, prevents them from uncovering the pervasive and 
consistent deployment of racial exhaustion rhetoric and its prominent role 
in contesting racial egalitarianism and shaping public opinion concerning 
the appropriateness of such measures.  
 
 
 45. This list does not exhaust the rhetorical claims of countermovements to racial justice. In fact, 
other categories of arguments have persisted historically as well. See Christopher A. Bracey, The Cul 
de Sac of Race Preference Discourse, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1241 (2006) (discussing “innocence,” 
“merit,” “stigma” and “domestic tranquility” as common themes in arguments contesting race-based 
remedies). 
 46. See supra note 44. 
 47. Leach, supra note 44, at 434 (complicating notion that “new racism” is “new”). 
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B. Low Stamina: Racial Exhaustion in the Reconstruction Era 
1. From Abolition to Freedom  
Following the Civil War, the nation would vigorously debate the 
meaning of freedom for blacks. Echoing the contours of contemporary 
equality debates, political progressives and conservatives would clash over 
whether freedom and equality meant emancipation in strict formal terms, 
or whether it also involved the extension of political, civil, or social 
equality to blacks.48 Certainly, many former slaves hoped that freedom 
would imply more than formal emancipation. Instead, freedom should 
include economic independence, reparations, and political and civil 
equality.49 Blacks wanted to negotiate their economic lives as free laborers 
and to participate in the political life of the nation on terms equal to 
whites.50 They also saw education as a critical dimension of their 
development into a free and self-sufficient community.51 The thick version 
of equality imagined by blacks meant, as Frederick Douglas observed, that 
“the work does not end with the abolition of slavery, but only begins.”52 
2. Political Resistance to Racial Equality: Opposition to the 
Freedmen’s Bureau 
a. Congressional Opposition 
Blacks would find varying degrees of support for racial remedies 
among congressional Republicans. The most radical of the Republicans 
wanted to distribute confiscated plantations to the former slaves.53 
Generally, Republicans believed the national government should provide 
economic assistance and physical protection to the former slaves.54 In 
1865, Congress created the Freedmen’s Bureau to deliver essential goods 
 
 
 48. See generally Pamela Brandwein, Slavery as an Interpretive Issue in the Reconstruction 
Congresses, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 315 (2000) (arguing that differing conceptions of freedom and 
equality explain the policy preferences of the Republicans and Democrats in the Reconstruction 
Congress). 
 49. FONER, supra note 14, at 110–19 (discussing early political activities in the emancipation 
period). 
 50. Id. at 78 (“[U]nderpinning the specific aspirations [of the freed slaves] lay a broader theme: a 
desire for independence from white control, for autonomy both as individuals and as members of a 
community itself being transformed as a result of emancipation.”). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 76. 
 53. Id. at 68. 
 54. Id. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] RACIAL EXHAUSTION 929 
 
 
 
 
and services to the newly freed slaves.55 Initially an agency in the War 
Department, the Freedmen’s Bureau provided extensive services to the 
former slaves despite a political culture that disfavored extensive aid to the 
poor, especially as a federal imperative. The Bureau would ultimately 
facilitate the development of over 3000 schools for black children in the 
South; establish tribunals to entertain complaints of whites’ maltreatment 
of blacks; attend to the urgent health crisis among the former slave 
population by giving them care in military hospitals and federally 
established civilian health clinics; monitor court proceedings involving 
blacks in the South; represent blacks in lawsuits against whites; and 
distribute confiscated lands to former slaves (a controversial policy that 
Congress eventually abandoned).56 
A complicated mixture of overt racial prejudice, free market theories, 
and appeals to federalism framed political opposition to the Bureau. 
Congressional opponents also invoked an early narrative of racial 
exhaustion in their arguments contesting the agency’s appropriateness. 
Specifically, opponents argued that the Bureau (1) was excessive in terms 
of its substantive scope and duration; (2) discriminated against and 
infringed the liberty of whites and gave blacks a special status;57 (3) was a 
redundant and wasteful undertaking because the Civil War and the 
subsequent ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment had already secured 
the freedom and well-being of blacks; (4) was unnecessary because 
individual shortcomings, rather than racial oppression, explained the 
vulnerability of blacks; and (5) wasted resources because the law could not 
alter race relations. Many of the opponents subscribed to blatantly racist 
ideologies; yet, they also framed their arguments in terms of racial 
exhaustion.  
Members of Congress challenged the Bureau by repeatedly 
characterizing it as an excessive and boundless undertaking. Senator 
Guthrie of Kentucky, for example, stated that he was “astonished at the 
extreme measures” proposed in the legislation.58 After discussing the cost 
of operating the agency, Senator Saulsbury of Delaware described the 
proposed legislation as a “bill” of “magnificent” proportions.59 Senator 
 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. at 142–70 (discussing Bureau activities). 
 57. Other scholars have examined the rhetoric of opponents to the Bureau as resting on charges 
of reverse discrimination. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 755–75 (1985) (discussing debates over various versions 
of Bureau legislation). 
 58. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 346 (1866). 
 59. Id. at 362. 
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Davis of Kentucky argued that the bill was a “bold, reckless, and 
unconstitutional system of measures.”60 After President Johnson vetoed 
the legislation,61 Senator Davis contested Republican efforts to override 
the veto by reiterating his observation that the Bureau was excessive:  
This is a synopsis of the act. It organizes the largest and most 
expensive eleemosynary institution that ever existed, and adopts all 
the Negro population of the United States, numbering about four 
and an half millions [sic], as their wards; and it provides that the 
support of any of them may, as a large portion of them necessarily 
must, become a charge upon it.62 
Lawmakers also objected to efforts to make the Bureau a “permanent” 
federal agency.63 Mirroring arguments in contemporary affirmative action 
discourse,64 opponents questioned the open-ended nature of the legislation. 
Senator Hendricks of Indiana, for example, argued that: 
[T]his bill proposes that the bureau shall be permanent. I ask 
Senators, in the first place, if they are now, with the most 
satisfactory information that is before the body, willing to do that 
which they refused to do at the last session of Congress. We refused 
to pass the law when it proposed to establish a permanent 
department . . . . [I]s the Senate now . . . willing to make this a 
permanent bureau and department of the government?65 
The opposition viewed with suspicion the continuation of the agency, now 
that “peace and quiet . . . prevail[ed] over the country.”66 At the infancy of 
national efforts to disestablish the substantive impact of slavery, 
opponents of race-based remedies demanded strict time limits around such 
policies. 
When viewed in an historical context, the objecting Senators’ 
arguments reflect a political culture in which massive relief to poor people 
was unprecedented, particularly as a function of the federal government.67 
 
 
 60. Id. at 402. 
 61. See infra text accompanying notes 94–95. 
 62. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 933 (1866). 
 63. Id. at 315. 
 64. See infra text accompanying notes 236–54. 
 65. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 315 (1866). 
 66. Id. 
 67. JAMES MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 842 (1988) (“[T]he 
Freedmen’s Bureau represented an unprecedented extension of the federal government into matters of 
social welfare and labor relations.”); Michele Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic State, 23 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 387, 408–19 (2005) (discussing Bureau as “innovation” leading to wider federal role in relief to 
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But the Bureau’s congressional opponents also depicted the agency as 
excessive by portraying the South as racially benevolent, and asserting that 
preexisting measures already secured blacks’ well-being. Senator 
Hendricks, for example, proclaimed that: 
The President of the United States informs us that the southern 
States themselves are adopting measures with a view to the 
protection and prosperity of the colored people, and this within so 
short a period after the close of the war, when we could scarcely 
have expected that the reorganization of the southern States would 
have gone so far, when we could scarcely have expected that the 
prejudices engendered by the war would have passed away to such 
an extent as that the southern States themselves would have taken 
this very important and desirable step.68 
Hendricks observed further that the Thirteenth Amendment made the 
former slaves “as free as any Senator upon this floor.”69 Senator Guthrie 
added that the Thirteenth Amendment effected the “complete freedom of 
every individual”70 and that it “[broke] down every provision in the 
Constitution and laws of the United States and of the several States which 
prevents the enjoyment of that freedom.”71 Senator Cowan of 
Pennsylvania made a similar assertion, observing that “there is ample 
remedy now” for any injustice done to blacks.72 The Thirteenth 
Amendment obviated the need for antiracist legislation.  
Dissenting members of Congress also argued that the Bureau 
encouraged idleness among blacks, discriminated against whites, and gave 
blacks special benefits. These nineteenth-century arguments correlate 
strongly with contemporary political and juridical debates contesting the 
propriety of race-based remedies, such as affirmative action.73 The debates 
surrounding the Bureau demonstrate that public frustration with legal 
efforts to alleviate the substantive effects of racial injustice did not 
recently emerge as the inevitable consequence of protracted legal efforts to 
 
 
the poor); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Political Change: A Reply to Tushnet, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1594 (2004) (describing the Bureau as among “the first glimmer of federally 
operated social welfare agencies”); W. Sherman Rogers, The Quest for Black Economic Liberty: 
Legal, Historical, and Related Considerations, 48 HOW. L.J. 1, 40 (2004) (“The Freedmen’s Bureau 
was the first federal welfare agency.”). 
 68. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 315 (1866). 
 69. Id. at 317. 
 70. Id. at 335. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 340. 
 73. See infra text accompanying notes 221–54. 
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dismantle racism. Instead, the rhetoric of racial exhaustion challenged 
even the earliest national policies designed to remedy racial subjugation. 
Contesting the proposed legislation, Senator Saulsbury complained that: 
[H]undreds and thousands of the negro race have been supported 
out of the Treasury of the United States, and you and I and the white 
people of this country are taxed to pay that expense. For the first 
time in the history of this country has the thing occurred, that the 
great mass of the people have been taxed to support in idleness a 
class who are too lazy or too worthless to support themselves.74 
Challenging the proposed distribution of land to the former slaves, 
Salisbury further argued that: 
No land is to be provided for the poor white men of this country, not 
even poor land; but when it comes to the negro race three million 
acres must be set apart, and it must be “good land” at that. I know 
that the bill provides that this land shall be rented to the negro; but 
those of you who have observed the thriftiness and skill with which 
the negro population manage their agricultural operations, will find 
that when Sambo comes to pay his rent[,] his rent will be pretty 
much like the rent of the individual who, when his landlord called 
upon him for his one third of the produce of the farm, said, “Sir, I 
did not produce a third.” He will raise nothing to pay the rent.75 
Echoing Saulsbury’s observations, Senator Davis criticized the legislation 
for distinguishing among “paupers”; he argued that “[i]f there is an 
obligation or a duty or a power to take care of the negro paupers, there is, I 
suppose, an equal obligation to take care of the white paupers of different 
States.”76 Senator Johnson of Maryland opined that remedying social 
vulnerability must take place in a color-blind fashion:  
If there is an authority in the Constitution to provide for the black 
citizen, it cannot be because he is black; it must be because he is a 
citizen; and that reason being equally applicable to the white man as 
to the black man, it would follow that we have the authority to 
clothe and educate and provide for all citizens of the United States 
who may need education and providing for.77 
 
 
 74. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 362 (1866). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 370. 
 77. Id. at 372. 
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For Senator Johnson, however, a general authority to provide relief to poor 
persons would exceed the scope of congressional power.78  
Having construed the proposed legislation as an excessive, 
unnecessary, and discriminatory intervention, the objecting senators 
concluded that it would give “special rights” to blacks. Special rights 
discourse has retained an important presence in contemporary civil rights 
discourse, even outside of the context of race.79 Deploying this theme 
during Reconstruction, Senator McDougall of California argued that: 
“Everything that is proposed to be done is inviting [blacks] to think that 
they are not only quite as good as, but a little better than . . . the white 
races.”80 He further observed that the Bureau would make blacks 
“superior” to whites,81 give them “favors that the poor white boy in the 
North cannot get,”82 and treat blacks more positively than “the Indian, 
whom I hold to be a nobler and far superior race.”83 Senator Hendricks 
echoed the special rights theme, observing that: 
I have not heard since Congress met that any colored man has done 
a wrong in this country for very many years; and I have scarcely 
heard that any white man coming in contact with colored people has 
done right for a number of years. Everybody is expected to take 
sides for the colored man against the white man. If I have to take 
sides, it will be with the men of my own color and my own race; but 
I do not wish to do that.84 
Even as he condemned the proposed legislation as constituting reverse 
discrimination, Senator Hendricks expressed a commitment to white 
supremacy.  
Members of the Reconstruction Congress also argued that the Bureau 
infringed the liberty of whites. Senator Hendricks, for example, asserted 
that the Bureau was “more dangerous to the liberties of the people than 
 
 
 78. Id. at 372–73 (disputing Congress’ authority to provide welfare relief). See also John M. 
Bickers, The Power to Do What Manifestly Must Be Done: Congress, the Freedmen’s Bureau, and 
Constitutional Imagination, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 70, 102 (2006) (observing that Senator 
Johnson believed that equal application of the Bureau’s activities would imply boundless 
Congressional power). 
 79. See Jeffrey R. Dudas, In the Name of Equal Rights: “Special” Rights and the Politics of 
Resentment in Post-Civil Rights America, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 723, 724–25, 730–31 (2005) 
(discussing disparagement of equality measures as “special rights” in contemporary political 
discourse). 
 80. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 401 (1866). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 319. 
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that against which our forefathers fought in the Revolution.”85 Similarly, 
Senator Davis contended that the legislation would cause the “grinding 
oppression of eight million white people”86 and would “reenslave the 
freedmen and . . . reduce the white race of the southern States to a slavery 
even lower than that of the blacks.”87  
Finally, members of Congress opposed the legislation on the grounds 
that law could not improve race relations. Despite the fact that many of 
these same individuals argued that existing laws provided sufficient 
protection for blacks against maltreatment by whites, Bureau opponents 
asserted that racial transformation could only take place through mutual 
assent of the races. Senator Davis, for example, insisted that: 
The late owners and their slaves know, or would soon learn and 
recognize the fact, that mutual confidence and good will are 
essential to the welfare of both races. The white man would be 
taught that he could win these from the black man only by justice, 
kindness, and respectful treatment; and the latter would not be slow 
in understanding that a diligent and faithful performance of his 
duties to his employer, and an obliging disposition toward him and 
his family, would not only secure his rights, but also a generous 
sympathy.88 
Davis concluded that “[i]f Congress would refrain from all intermeddling 
with these matters . . . they would soon be adjusted upon a basis 
combining justice, humanity, and the soundest policy.”89  
During one of the earliest periods of sustained national attention to 
racial inequality, members of Congress portrayed the United States as 
having moved beyond racial abuses, and they depicted racial 
egalitarianism as excessive, futile, injurious to whites, and as providing 
special benefits to blacks. The comments of Senator Cowan provide a 
striking example of the deployment of racial exhaustion rhetoric in 
Reconstruction-era race equality debates. An exasperated Cowan 
wondered “where these [racial] difficulties are to end.”90 He complained 
that: 
 
 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 936. 
 87. Id. at 935. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 343. 
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We have made the negro free. . . . But what next? After the negro is 
free we are told that he cannot protect himself; we must do 
something for him. Well, what more must we do? We must give 
him a vote. What good will that do him? It will only multiply the 
chances of his having his head broken at the polls in contact with a 
much stronger race than he is. . . . [A]nd if we give him a vote 
tomorrow, what then? . . . What more must you do for him? You 
must allow him to hold office. A vote, of course is a mere induction 
to the exercise of power. . . . Then the negro must hold office; and is 
he any better after that?91 
Cowan also stated that he “should like to know where this is going to 
end—this insane crusade to try to do something which is not in the nature 
of things to do?”92 Members of the House of Representatives made similar 
claims about the legislation.93 
b. Presidential Opposition 
Although Congress voted to extend the Bureau, President Johnson 
vetoed the legislation. President Johnson’s veto message restates many of 
the arguments made by congressional opponents of the Bureau. Johnson 
argued that the Bureau was wasteful and redundant due to the elimination 
of slavery: 
The institution of slavery . . . has been already effectually and 
finally abrogated throughout the whole country by an amendment of 
the Constitution of the United States, and practically its eradication 
has received the assent and concurrence of most of those States in 
which it at any time had an existence. I am not, therefore, able to 
discern, in the condition of the country, anything to justify an 
apprehension that the powers and agencies of the Freedmen’s 
Bureau, which were effective for the protection of freedmen and 
refugees during the actual continuance of hostilities and of African 
servitude, will now, in a time of peace and after the abolition of 
slavery, prove inadequate to the same proper ends.94 
 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Schnapper, supra note 57, at 756–57 (discussing legislative debates concerning various 
versions of the Bureau legislation). 
 94. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 916 (1866). 
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Johnson articulated additional reasons for vetoing the legislation, and 
these arguments also construct a narrative of racial exhaustion. Like the 
objecting members of Congress, Johnson viewed race-based remedies as 
unfair and detrimental to whites. Responding to portions of the bill 
providing for the construction of schools for blacks and for the provision 
of shelter to the former slaves, Johnson argues that: 
[Congress] has never founded schools for any class of our own 
people, not even for the orphans of those who have fallen in the 
defense of the Union, but has left the care of education to the much 
more competent and efficient control of the States, of communities, 
of private associations, and of individuals. It has never deemed 
itself authorized to expend the public money for the rent or purchase 
of homes for the thousands, not to say millions, of the white race 
who are honestly toiling from day to day for their subsistence. A 
system for the support of indigent persons in the United States was 
never contemplated by the authors of the Constitution, nor can any 
good reason be advanced why, as a permanent establishment, it 
should be founded for one class or color of our people more than 
another.95 
Explicitly excluding blacks from his vision of “our” people, Johnson 
nonetheless appealed to equality principles in order to challenge remedies 
for the former slaves. Johnson’s arguments also express a commitment to 
states’ rights and a hostility to governmental support for poor people 
regardless of race, illustrating the historical enmeshment of racist ideology 
with principled arguments concerning the appropriate function of the 
State.96 Furthermore, Johnson, like the objecting Senators, appealed to 
class distinctions and, more specifically, to a pervasive belief that 
Congress should not provide relief to poor people regardless of race. 
Johnson also disagreed with the continuation of the Bureau on the 
grounds that blacks had sufficient opportunities for subsistence, and that 
governmental assistance would therefore stigmatize them: “The idea on 
which the slaves were assisted to freedom was that, on becoming free, 
they would be a self-sustaining population. Any legislation that shall 
imply that they are not expected to attain a self-sustaining condition must 
have a tendency injurious alike to their character and their prospects.”97 
Johnson’s arguments track modern discourse disfavoring race-based 
 
 
 95. Id. (emphasis added). 
 96. See infra text accompanying notes 311–15. 
 97. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 916 (1866) (emphasis added). 
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remedies. He views racial redress as a handout to blacks, unfair to whites, 
unnecessary given the progress the country had already made, and 
excessive in terms of substantive scope and duration.98 
3. Reconstruction-Era Jurisprudence  
The Reconstruction-era Court generally embraced conservative 
sentiment and, in a series of cases, invalidated important civil rights 
legislation and restrained the ability of federal authorities to protect blacks 
from subjugation. The factual context of the first Court decision involving 
a claim under the Civil War Amendments did not concern race. In the 
Slaughter-House Cases,99 the Court rejected a challenge to a Louisiana 
law that removed slaughtering companies from New Orleans, forced them 
to locate at a site outside of the city, and required that they pay a fee to 
transact business.100 Although the state justified the law on public-health 
grounds,101 the plaintiffs argued that the law deprived them of equal 
protection, a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States, and 
“property” without due process of law; they also argued that the law 
interfered with their ability to control their own labor, which allegedly 
violated the Thirteenth Amendment.102 Much of the scholarship analyzing 
this decision focuses on the Court’s narrow reading of the privileges and 
immunities clause and its constrained view of national power.103 But many 
scholars have linked this case with judicial intolerance of Reconstruction, 
despite the pronounced absence of race in the immediate factual context of 
the litigation.104  
On the surface, Slaughter-House is deceptively antiracist. The case, in 
very powerful language, holds that the Civil War Amendments were 
designed to ensure the freedom of the slaves and to protect them from 
 
 
 98. Cf. FONER, supra note 14, at 248 (“Johnson voiced themes that to this day have sustained 
opposition to federal intervention on behalf of blacks.”). 
 99. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
 100. Id. at 59–60. 
 101. Id. at 64. 
 102. Id. at 66. 
 103. See, e.g., Michael G. Collins, “Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional Actions, and the 
Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1547 (1983) (“[T]he most common criticism of Slaughter-
House is that it rendered the privileges or immunities clause superfluous.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The 
Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. 
L. REV. 409, 417 (1990) (“[T]he radical change in federalism the Slaughter-House Court rejected was 
precisely what the Republican drafters and supporters of the fourteenth amendment intended.”). 
 104. See, e.g., Rogers M. Smith, Legitimating Reconstruction! The Limits on Legalism, 108 YALE 
L.J. 2039, 2072 (1999) (linking Slaughter-House with “judicial retreat from using the reconstruction 
amendments to protect blacks”). 
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enduring oppression by whites.105 The economic discrimination claim of 
the white business owners fell beyond the scope of the “pervading 
purpose” of the Amendments.106 The Court’s narrow construction of 
federal authority, however, had substantial implications for the ability of 
Congress to elaborate racial equality and disestablish slavery.107 Slaughter-
House viewed the creation and enforcement of rights and liberties 
primarily as a function of states, although the historical record provided 
little evidence for general optimism that state governments would 
effectively protect blacks from racial domination.108 Despite this reality, 
the Court feared that congressional elaboration and enforcement of rights 
secured by the Civil War Amendments would “fetter and degrade” state 
governments,109 and it ruled that federal judicial remedies would make the 
Court a “perpetual censor” of state legislation.110 Although the case 
involved nonracial claims, the Court’s ruling nonetheless implied judicial 
intolerance with Congress’ Reconstruction agenda.111 Before any black 
 
 
 105. The Court holds that: 
We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of events, almost too recent to be called 
history, but which are familiar to us all; and on the most casual examination of the language 
of these amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found 
in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been 
even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of 
that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions 
of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him. It is true that only the 
fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions the negro by speaking of his color and his slavery. 
But it is just as true that each of the other articles was addressed to the grievances of that race, 
and designed to remedy them as the fifteenth. 
Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 71–72. 
 106. Id. at 71. 
 107. Smith, supra note 104, at 2072 (arguing that the Court chose Slaughter-House as the “first 
Fourteenth Amendment case to launch a judicial retreat from using the Reconstruction amendments to 
protect blacks” and that the “retreat would . . . only increase for the remainder of the century”). 
 108. As Slaughter-House itself acknowledges, states across the South had enacted repressive 
Black Codes which effectively placed many of the former slaves back on plantations and mandated 
discrimination and mistreatment against them in a host of settings. See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 70. 
 109. Id. at 78. The Court held that: 
[W]hen, as in the case before us, these consequences are so serious, so far-reaching and 
pervading, so great a departure from the structure and spirit of our institutions; when the 
effect is to fetter and degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the control of 
Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore universally conceded to them of the most 
ordinary and fundamental character; when in fact it radically changes the whole theory of the 
relations of the State and Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to 
the people; the argument has a force that is irresistible, in the absence of language which 
expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt. 
Id. at 78 (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. 
 111. PHILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND DECLINE 
OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 85 (1999) (“[T]he justices must have known that this reasoning 
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litigant could assert a claim under the Reconstruction Amendments before 
the Court, the Justices placed strict boundaries around federal enforcement 
of civil rights. On its own terms, the Court acted to avoid perpetual 
involvement by the national government in the affairs of the states. 
Following Slaughter-House, a number of other decisions by the Court 
greatly undermined Congressional authority to protect blacks from 
oppression.112  
C. The End of Reconstruction 
During Reconstruction and after its end, blacks suffered increasing 
racial terror. Much of the violence directed towards blacks sought to police 
their exercise of political liberties.113 The situation became extremely 
graphic during the 1870s. Although President Grant won the election in 
1872, national public opinion became increasingly intolerant of 
Reconstruction and federal intervention in racial conflicts.114 The Colfax 
Massacre of 1873115 and other violent eruptions would test national 
resolve for federal protection of southern blacks.116 In 1874 another violent 
election took place in Louisiana, and the Republican governor requested 
that President Grant eject white Democrats from the state legislature.117 
Federal troops removed the individuals, sparking a controversy that further 
eroded public support for Reconstruction.118 One newspaper declared that 
“People are becoming tired of . . . abstract questions, in which the 
overwhelming majority of them have no direct interest. The negro 
 
 
also prevented the federal judicial protection of African American citizens against the growing number 
of ‘Redeemed’ southern state governments, governments that were being recaptured by whites 
virulently opposed to racial equality.”). 
 112. Gautham Rao, The Federal Posse Comitatus Doctrine: Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft 
in Mid-Nineteenth-Century America, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 51 (2008) (discussing a “string of 
decisions,” including Slaughter-House, “that effectively removed the foundational rationale for 
Reconstruction” and which made “Reconstruction laws . . . all but dead letters”). 
 113. WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION: 1869–1879, at 27–46 (1979) 
(discussing violence against southern blacks during 1870s and 1880s); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking 
Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. 
REV. 683, 700 (2004) (“Although the Fourteenth Amendment abolished the black codes and blacks 
achieved admirable political gains in the South during Reconstruction, the withdrawal of federal troops 
triggered a determined movement by whites to disenfranchise blacks through violence, intimidation, 
and a variety of voting ‘qualifications’ designed and administered to prevent blacks from voting.”). 
 114. KLINKNER & SMITH, supra note 111, at 80. 
 115. See supra text accompanying notes 14–17. 
 116. See KLINKNER & SMITH, supra note 111, at 85 (arguing that in the mid-1870s, “the Grant 
administration lost most of its waning energy for restraining southern whites” and that “[i]t was clear 
that such efforts would get little support in court or at the polls”). 
 117. FONER, supra note 14, at 551. 
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question, with all its complications, and the reconstruction of the Southern 
States, with all its interminable embroilments, have lost much of the power 
they once wielded.”119 Or as one Republican politician would state: “our 
people are tired out with this worn out cry of Southern outrages.”120  
The Supreme Court would echo the public’s frustration in case law 
limiting the ability of Congress to protect black voters from organized 
violence by whites.121 Furthermore, after Democrats won control of the 
House of Representatives in 1874, “congressional” reconstruction 
effectively ended, in spite of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 
(which the Court eventually felt unconstitutional).122 Furthermore, in 1875, 
Adelbert Ames, the Republican governor of Mississippi, requested that the 
federal government respond to violent intimidation of black and white 
Republican voters.123 President Grant’s advisors, however, persuaded him 
not to intervene because federal involvement could jeopardize Republican 
candidates in close election contests in Ohio.124 Accordingly, Grant 
declined Ames’s request and explained that: “The whole public are tired 
out with these annual autumnal outbreaks in the South, and the great 
majority are now ready to condemn any interference on part of the 
government.”125 Whites’ weariness with Reconstruction, along with 
economic depression and political scandals, would tarnish the Republican 
party.126 Republicans, however, would maintain control of the White 
House after the heavily contested, divisive, and (in key southern states) 
violent presidential election of 1876.127 Rutherford B. Hayes assumed 
office, embraced a conciliatory posture with the South,128 and began 
removing the remaining troops from the southern states.129 The South was 
 
 
 119. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 581 
(1992) (emphasis added). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See supra text accompanying notes 99–112. 
 122. KLINKNER & SMITH, supra note 111, at 85–86. 
 123. Id. at 87. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. (emphasis added). 
 126. Id. at 85–89. 
 127. Id. at 89 (discussing election of 1876). 
 128. Historians have long argued whether this position of conciliation was negotiated to end the 
election stalemate. See id. at 89 (“Historians have long debated whether white Southerners acquiesced 
in this result because Hayes had, as was then charged, made an ‘infamous bargain’ to end 
Reconstruction in return for possession of the White House.”). 
 129. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 120 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The 
turning point in the States’ favor came with the Compromise of 1877, when the Republican Party 
agreed effectively to end Reconstruction and to withdraw federal troops from the South in return for 
Southern acquiescence in the decision of the Electoral Commission that awarded the disputed 1876 
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officially “redeemed,”130 and Reconstruction dwindled to an end. After 
only ten years, concentrated legal efforts to disestablish slavery and to 
respond to white supremacist violence had become too taxing for the 
nation to sustain. 
D. Judicial Validation of Jim Crow 
1. “Getting Over Slavery” 
In 2007, the State of Virginia passed a resolution apologizing for its 
role in slavery and Jim Crow. Although state lawmakers unanimously 
approved the resolution, legislative debates sparked a controversy when 
state senator Frank Hargrove opined that “I personally think that our black 
citizens should get over [slavery]. . . . By golly, we’re living in 2007.”131 
Attitudes like Hargrove’s have often colored United States racial 
discourse. Opposition to race-based civil rights measures, even an 
innocuous and belated apology for slavery, has often rested on the notion 
that slavery no longer affects the status of blacks.132 But, as congressional 
debates over Reconstruction legislation demonstrate, this assumption 
framed racial discourse at the earliest moments subsequent to abolition.133 
Arguments that seek to detach prior acts of racism from the present-day 
status of persons of color employ racial exhaustion rhetoric because they 
attempt to depict the United States as post-racist. Court rulings 
immunizing Jim Crow from federal invalidation illustrate how racial 
exhaustion rhetoric has justified judicial opposition to antiracist initiatives 
and claims of racial injustice. In the Civil Rights Cases,134 the Court 
invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which banned racial 
discrimination in places of public accommodation.135 The Court held that 
Congress lacked the authority to regulate “private” conduct under its 
Section Five power.136 While the Court ruled that Congress could regulate 
private behavior under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment, it 
concluded that nineteenth-century racial segregation in places of public 
 
 
 130. FONER, supra note 14, 587–601 (discussing final stages of southern “redemption”). 
 131. Bob Gibson, Slavery Apology Measure Ignites Legislative Debate, DAILY PROGRESS 
(Charlottesville, Va.), Jan. 16, 2007. Criticizing the reach of the apology, Hargrove also pondered 
whether “we [are] going to force the Jews to apologize for killing Christ.” Id. 
 132. EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS 79 (2006) (discussing portrayal of 
slavery as representing remote and as a vehicle for denying its present-day effects). 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 68–72. 
 134. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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accommodation did not relate to slavery and was thus beyond the scope of 
congressional invalidation.137 Near the end of the decision, the Court 
essentially advised blacks to get over slavery: 
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent 
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, 
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he 
takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite 
of the laws . . . .138 
The Court’s dicta contain many elements of racial exhaustion rhetoric. 
Following the logic of President Johnson and the members of Congress 
who opposed the Freedmen’s Bureau, the Court found that blacks have in 
fact “emerged” from slavery.139 Although the legal institution of slavery 
had been formally abolished, blacks experienced violent subjugation, 
segregation, economic vulnerability, and disenfranchisement, which the 
Court’s ruling strains to bifurcate from slavery. 
2. Plessy and Racial Exhaustion 
After the Civil Rights Cases, the Court ruled that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not bar states from mandating racial segregation. In 
Plessy v. Ferguson,140 the Court sustained a Louisiana statute requiring 
racial segregation in state railroad carriers.141 Together, Plessy and the 
Civil Rights Cases provided constitutional legitimacy for Jim Crow and 
rendered it impermeable to federal invalidation.142 
Plessy infamously held that blacks themselves chose to believe that 
segregation codified white supremacy.143 The Court also ruled that law 
 
 
 137. Id. at 21–25. 
 138. Id. at 25. 
 139. Id. 
 140. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 141. Id. at 552. 
 142. See Francisco M. Ugarte, Reconstruction Redux: Rehnquist, Morrison, and the Civil Rights 
Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 484 (2006) (“Considered in tandem, [Plessy and the Civil 
Rights Cases] were instrumental in the creation of a new legal regime that, as part of its essential 
character, established and perpetuated racial subordination throughout nearly all elements of American 
society.”). 
 143. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption 
that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of 
inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the 
colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. 
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could not eradicate racism. Instead, the Constitution could only secure 
formal racial equality (limited to civil and political rights) and “equal 
opportunities for improvement and progress.”144 Plessy does not deny the 
existence of racial discrimination as such, but it fails to accept that racial 
distinctions implied or constructed racial hierarchy or that the law could 
otherwise eradicate racial inequality. The Court treated Jim Crow as a 
form of benign discrimination. Plessy also reflected the general consensus 
among whites at the time.145 
The analysis in Plessy resembles modern racial exhaustion discourse 
which questions and distrusts blacks’ claims of racial injustice and which 
asserts that to the extent discrimination exists, the law lacks the 
competence to regulate it. After Plessy and through the early 1900s, the 
Court did very little to enforce the substantive rights of blacks.146 Indeed, 
during the early 1900s, the status of race relations and public support for 
substantive racial justice was at a “nadir,” and southern blacks experienced 
racial terror, disenfranchisement, and discrimination in virtually every 
aspect of their lives.147 While the Court did issue some rulings invalidating 
racially discriminatory state action, many of these cases secured minimal 
procedural justice and protected blacks from only the most extreme 
unfairness, such as the effective reinstatement of slavery through a system 
of peonage and blatant violations of the Fifteenth Amendment through 
enactments such as “grandfather clauses.”148 As Michael Klarman’s 
extensive review of case law and historical data during this era suggests, 
these decisions, though favorable to blacks, had very little immediate 
material impact upon the subordinate status of blacks, although they were 
central in the formation of social movement lawyering on questions of 
 
 
 144. Id. (“When the government, therefore, has secured to each of its citizens equal rights before 
the law and equal opportunities for improvement and progress, it has accomplished the end for which 
it was organized, and performed all of the functions respecting social advantages with which it is 
endowed.”) (citing People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 448 (1883)). Gallagher upheld 
segregated public schools in the State of New York, using the same arguments made in Plessy. 
Gallagher, 93 N.Y. at 438. 
 145. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 48 (arguing that in the “1890s, most southern whites strongly 
favored segregation” and that “[n]orthern whites were increasingly inclined to accommodate the racial 
preferences of white southerners”). 
 146. Id. at 47 (“Except for a few insignificant jury discrimination cases, the Court during the 
Plessy era rejected all civil rights claims.”). 
 147. RAYFORD W. LOGAN, THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN LIFE AND THOUGHT: THE NADIR 1877–
1901 (1954); see also KLARMAN, supra note 145, at 63; Mark V. Tushnet, Progressive Era Race 
Relations Cases in Their “Traditional” Context, 51 VAND. L. REV. 993, 993 (1998). 
 148. KLARMAN, supra note 145, at 70 (describing the grandfather clause matter as an “easy” issue 
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racial inequality.149 Peonage relationships continued throughout the South, 
and while the Court invalidated grandfather clauses, it legitimated or did 
not entertain challenges to other common restraints on black political 
participation, including literacy or knowledge tests.150 The southern states 
continued to prevent blacks from voting through violence, intimidation, 
and a variety of legislative schemes clearly designed to evade the Fifteenth 
Amendment.151 Several important domestic and international events, 
however, coalesced and created political opportunities for advancements 
in racial justice.152 These advancements, like the structural changes that 
took place during Reconstruction, provoked political opposition. 
Opponents to twentieth-century racial egalitarian measures often 
expressed their discontent by employing racial exhaustion rhetoric.  
III. AN ONGOING NARRATIVE OF RACIAL EXHAUSTION: RACIAL 
DISCOURSE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND BEYOND 
A. Twentieth-Century Evolution in Racial Attitudes 
1. War and Race 
Following the Progressive Era, which was a time of immense racial 
injustice, several factors led to moderation in the nation’s attitudes towards 
race. Many historians cite the following developments as affecting early 
twentieth-century evolution in racial discourse. First, industrialization and 
labor shortages during World War I gave rise to economic opportunities 
for blacks in northern and midwestern states.153 Subsequently, large 
numbers of blacks migrated from the South to northern cities.154 Blacks’ 
political power increased substantially due to the Great Migration, because 
northern states, unlike the South, did not engage in systematic 
disenfranchisement of blacks, even as they embraced residential and other 
forms of discrimination.155 Collective black voting power would soon 
 
 
 149. Id. at 61–97. 
 150. Id. at 95–96. 
 151. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional 
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2078 (2002). Even if these cases did not have 
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Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910–1920), 20 LAW & HIST. 
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 152. See infra text accompanying notes 153–81. 
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affect local and national politics, which rekindled public debates about 
racial injustice.156  
War rhetoric also enhanced political opportunities for antiracist 
mobilization. The country framed its participation in World War I as an 
effort to protect “democracy.”157 Although many blacks refrained from 
civil rights activism to show unity during the war, some black political 
leaders, nevertheless, invoked the “democracy” rhetoric to challenge 
domestic racial subjugation.158 Decades later, World War II caused 
similar, even more potent, disruptions in race politics.159 
The New Deal period also enhanced the visibility of race and black 
political power.160 The Great Depression had exacerbated the already 
vulnerable economic status of blacks.161 Although blacks did not support 
Roosevelt in the 1932 presidential election,162 his liberal economic policies 
created a massive reallocation of political power: blacks flocked to the 
Democratic Party in the 1936 presidential election (and have virtually 
remained aligned with the Democrats since that time).163 Roosevelt won 
seventy-six percent of black votes,164 and political parties began to 
recognize blacks as an important voting bloc, which planted the seeds for 
racial patronage and moderation.165 
Racial egalitarianism, however, remained slight. Many of the New 
Deal programs were administered in a discriminatory fashion.166 Some, 
like Aid to Dependent Children, for example, gave states discretion to 
determine assistance levels (and southern states routinely disfavored 
blacks).167 Other programs discriminated at the national level, such as the 
 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 104; KLINKNER & SMITH, supra note 111, at 111. 
 158. KLARMAN, supra note 145, at 104; KLINKNER & SMITH, supra note 111, at 114. 
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 161. Id. at 108. 
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Federal Housing Administration’s refusal to lend money to blacks who 
desired to move into predominately white neighborhoods.168 And despite 
the importance of black voters, Roosevelt took conservative positions on 
race in order to appease southern Democrats. He declined, for example, to 
support anti-lynching legislation, fearing that doing so would alienate and 
anger southerners in Congress and provoke opposition to his New Deal 
policies.169 And during World War II, Roosevelt ordered the internment of 
Japanese Americans.170 
As Mary Dudziak’s extensive research has documented, World War II 
and the subsequent Cold War period provided very potent political 
opportunities for racial advancement.171 The United States justified its 
involvement in the war as a moral crusade against Fascism and Nazism.172 
The genocidal practices of the Hitler regime, furthermore, led to 
reexamination of racial supremacy.173 Consequently, intellectual support 
for eugenics waned, and biological notions of race rapidly lost scientific 
credibility.174 These factors permitted evolution in the nation’s racial 
ideology. Blacks protested the inherent contradiction in waging a war 
against Nazism abroad while supporting or failing to counter domestic 
white supremacy.175 Blacks also criticized military policies of segregating 
troops and military bases, discriminating in the administration of the 
Selective Service, and permitting discrimination in defense industries.176 
The need for black participation in the military provided a mutuality of 
interest that facilitated racial advancement.177 As a result of political 
activism by blacks, the release of government data indicating extremely 
low support for the war among blacks, and racial violence at military 
bases, Roosevelt issued executive orders during the war that ended all of 
the discriminatory policies of the military—except for troop 
segregation.178 By the end of the war, opinion polls indicated sharp 
movement toward racial egalitarian ideology among whites.179 Also, black 
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political power and economic status had increased substantially.180 These 
conditions allowed for significant changes in the legal status of blacks 
during the war and post-war period. New indications of racial 
egalitarianism in the post-war period would emerge at the state and 
national level. 
2. Prelude to the Second Reconstruction: State Civil Rights 
Legislation 
It was within this context of shifting domestic and international 
relations that New York enacted the Ives-Quinn Act—the first state statute 
that prohibited racial discrimination in employment.181 Although the New 
York legislature overwhelmingly supported the antidiscrimination 
measure, a vocal opposition contested its enactment.182 Anthony Chen’s 
research on the political debates surrounding Ives-Quinn permits an 
examination of the role of racial exhaustion rhetoric in post–World War II 
civil rights discourse.183 
The principle opposition to Ives-Quinn came from business and 
corporate legal communities and from rural and suburban whites and their 
legislative representatives (all of whom were conservative Republicans).184 
Opponents of Ives-Quinn questioned the law’s necessity by arguing that 
racial discrimination no longer existed and that the denial of employment 
to blacks resulted from their own shortcomings. One industry 
representative who argued against the proposal stated that he could not 
“conceive of any man discriminating against a Negro if he is skilled.”185 
Another industry leader disclaimed any personal knowledge of 
discrimination and insisted that the war had created racial egalitarianism, 
thus obviating the need for the legislation.186 Following a line of reasoning 
similar to Plessy,187 one employer claimed that law was incompetent to 
address racial discrimination and that “the only effective . . . method of 
 
 
 180. Id.; see also KLARMAN, supra note 145, at 179. 
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combating this evil is through persuasion, education, and good 
example.”188 The Wall Street Journal expressed a similar viewpoint and 
disagreed with the assumption that “the evil to which this bill addresses 
. . . can be effectively dealt with by any kind of statute.”189  
In addition, white suburbanites testified that the proposed legislation 
privileged persons of color to the detriment of whites, that individual 
deficiencies and pathologies explained racial inequality, and that the 
infrequency or nonexistence of racial discrimination obviated the need for 
protective legal measures. One New York voter, for example, complained 
that: 
[A] lot of us Americans were not lucky enough to be born a member 
of one of these minority groups, who high pressure you into putting 
over the Ives bill while our sons were away! These people were 
only interested in putting themselves in a favored position via 
kangaroo courts, Soviet style, regardless of their habits or behavior 
as individuals! There has been less general discrimination here than 
any place else in the world, the Ives Bill is an insult to all Tolerant 
Americans the state over!190 
The close correlation between the conservative debate over Ives-Quinn 
and contemporary racial exhaustion rhetoric, however, lies in the 
characterization of legislation as discriminating against whites and as 
leading inevitably to racial quotas. An upstate Republican lawmaker, for 
example, portrayed the proposed legislation as discriminatory, a viewpoint 
that well predates the reverse discrimination discourse surrounding 
contemporary challenges to affirmative action.191 Opponents also invoked 
the language of quotas in order to frame the proposed legislation in a most 
unfavorable light. The New York park commissioner testified that: 
The most vicious feature of this proposal is that it will inevitably 
lead to the establishment of what in European universities and 
institutions, from the Middle ages to World War II, was known as 
the “numerous clauses,” that is, the quota system under which Jews 
and other minorities were permitted only up to a fixed number 
proportionate to their percentage of the population.192 
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Whereas quotas historically harmed “Jews and other minorities,” Ives-
Quinn would unfairly invert this hierarchy in favor of vulnerable 
groups.193 As Anthony Chen has observed, the opponents to Ives-Quinn 
invoked the word “quota” for historically contingent purposes. They tried 
to link antidiscrimination with a recent history of anti-Jewish quotas in the 
United States and to draw parallels between Ives-Quinn and Nazism.194 
One journalist, who commented on the legislation, for example, explicitly 
tied civil rights and Nazism, asserting that the law would lead to the 
“Hitlerian rule of quotas.”195 Although many scholars trace the rhetorical 
linkage of civil rights and quotas to political debates during the 1960s, the 
history surrounding Ives-Quinn reveals that this element of racial 
discourse appeared much earlier.196 
C. From World War II to the Civil Rights Movement 
Dramatic changes in the landscape of racial discourse and legal policies 
towards racial inequality would take place at the national level after World 
War II. These shifts in the nation’s racial attitudes occurred in a 
transnational context.197 Cold War politics greatly impacted United States 
racial discourse. The United States justified its involvement in the Cold 
War as a battle to protect the world against the spread of communism.198 
The United States, according to this narrative, policed the world in order 
to preserve democracy and prevent totalitarianism.199 Internationally, the 
image of racial segregation and injustice impeded the persuasiveness of 
this narrative.200 Soviet and Chinese propaganda often exploited United 
States racism in order to undermine the moral narrative that framed the 
United States’ foreign relations.201 Domestically, civil rights groups and 
black activists would also stress the detrimental impact of racial injustice 
upon the nation’s international image in their advocacy for racial 
egalitarian policies.202 Some domestic civil rights groups filed petitions 
before the United Nations seeking to document before an international 
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audience the ways in which race subordinated persons of color in the 
United States.203 
While southerners would resist evolving racial norms through racial 
violence, overtly racist argumentation, and appeals to federalism and states 
rights, opponents to racial egalitarianism would often construct their 
arguments using racial exhaustion rhetoric. The same arguments that 
shaped debates during Reconstruction would also frame national race 
policy in the 1960s, or the Second Reconstruction. Congressional debates 
over the Civil Rights Act of 1964 demonstrate the persistence of racial 
exhaustion discourse as an instrument of countermovements to racial 
justice. Lawmakers who challenged the implementation of the legislation 
argued that (1) further statutory prohibitions of racial discrimination were 
unnecessary, given the efficacy of pre-existing legislation and the waning 
or nonexistence of racism; (2) the proposed legislation would overwhelm 
the national and state governments and cause excessive and unprecedented 
changes in the nation’s legal culture; (3) blacks suffer discrimination due 
to nonracial factors, such as slothfulness or lack of merit; (4) the 
legislation would harm whites because it constituted reverse 
discrimination, would lead to the implementation of racial quotas favoring 
persons of color, would deprive whites of liberty interests, and would give 
blacks a special status under the law; and (5) that the law as a general 
matter could not effectuate changes in race relations. 
Opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 frequently challenged the 
necessity of civil rights legislation. With respect to Title VII, for example, 
they argued that racial discrimination among employers had dissipated to 
the point of nonexistence, rendering the proposed legislation unjustifiable 
and excessive: 
Nondiscrimination in employment is generally accepted and 
practiced by both employers and unions. It would be both 
unfortunate and unwise if through our pronouncements it is implied, 
or could be assumed, that discrimination in employment is the 
general rule rather than the exception. It would also be a cruel 
disservice to the many dedicated citizens, government officials, 
union leaders, and employers who have worked tirelessly in this 
area and who, through their combined efforts, have effected on a 
voluntary basis great and lasting progress.204 
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Opponents made similar arguments to contest provisions in the proposed 
legislation that regulated participation in federal elections. They asserted 
that pre-existing legislation provided “more than ample authority . . . for 
all reasonable purposes in the enforcement of the rights of those who wish 
to vote in Federal elections”205 and that “[t]here is no need for this 
legislation . . . .”206 
Lawmakers also resisted the proposed legislation on the grounds that 
its magnitude would overwhelm federal and state governments. The 
dissenting members of Congress claimed that: 
 The depth, the revolutionary meaning of this act, is almost 
beyond description. It cannot be circumscribed, it cannot be said 
that it goes this far and no farther. The language written into this bill 
is not of that sort. It has open-end [sic] provisions that give it 
whatever depth and intensity one desires to read into it. . . . [It] vests 
. . . almost unlimited authority by the President and his appointees 
to do whatever they desire. 
 It is, in the most literal sense, revolutionary, destructive of the 
very essence of life as it has been lived in this country since the 
adoption of our Constitution . . . .207 
Lawmakers also alleged that blacks suffer discrimination due to factors 
other than race, including their own lack of merit or initiative. In some of 
these arguments, however, the dissenting members of Congress seem to 
conflate race and merit. For example, the opposition observed that: 
If this bill is enacted the farmer . . . would be required to hire people 
of all races, without preference for any race. If experience has 
taught the farmer that a member of one race is less reliable than a 
member of another race, does less for his pay, he will no longer be 
allowed to hire those he prefers for this reason. If he is of the belief 
that members of one race are more prone to accident, less 
trustworthy, more neglectful of duties, are, in short, less desirable 
employees than those of another race, he will no longer be allowed 
to exercise his independent judgment. Under the power conferred 
by this bill, he may be forced to hire according to race, to “racially 
 
 
is no longer existent. Race prejudice is rapidly being stamped out.”). 
 205. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, MINORITY REPORT ON PROPOSED CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1963 (1963), 
as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2458. 
 206. Id.  
 207. Id. at 2437. 
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balance” those who work for him in every job classification or be in 
violation of Federal law.208  
The opponents concluded that “[n]either competence nor experience is the 
key for employment under this bill. Race is the principal, first, 
criterion.”209 The lawmakers also argued that the proposed legislation 
would threaten homeowners and proprietors of places of public 
accommodation who discriminate on the basis of nonracial factors.210 
The civil rights opposition also asserted that the proposed legislation 
would compel companies to abandon merit-based hiring practices and 
instead select employees based on racial quotas: “[An employer] must 
employ the person of that race which, by ratio, is next up, even though he 
is certain in his own mind that the [candidate] he is not allowed to employ 
would be a superior employee.”211 They observed, moreover, that 
“contractors could be forced to actively recruit employees of a specified 
race and upgrade them into skilled classifications, although this would 
displace union members in the skilled trades.”212 The statute, in other 
words, would mandate “racism-in-reverse.”213 The opponents also argued 
that the legislation sacrificed the rights of whites in order to elevate 
persons of color: “[T]he bill, under the cloak of protecting the civil rights 
of certain minorities, will destroy civil rights of all citizens of the United 
States who fall within its scope.”214 As such, the law would give victims of 
discrimination “special” benefits; specifically, it would “place[] civil 
rights litigants . . . in a special category with preferences and advantages 
not afforded parties in any other form of litigation.”215 
Finally, lawmakers contested the proposed legislation on the grounds 
that law was incapable of improving race relations. The southern 
lawmakers asserted that “[e]xperience has proven that a state of mind or a 
 
 
 208. Id. at 2438. 
 209. Id. at 2440. 
 210. See id. at 2438 (“What if the person who seeks to rent a room, lease or buy a home, is not, in 
the eyes of the homeowner, trustworthy or desirable? If race, color, or national origin is involved—
and, by the nature of things, these must be involved—the Federal inspector . . . makes the decision.”); 
id. at 2441 (“[I]f a customer proves objectionable, the owner can have him removed from his premises 
only at peril of being in violation of the race laws.”). 
 211. Id. at 2441. 
 212. Id. at 2440–41. 
 213. Id. at 2441. 
 214. Id. at 2433. See also id. at 2430 (“I believe it is also my responsibility in seeking lawful 
rights for any minority group in America to also respect the lawful rights of others.” (statement of 
Representative Carleton J. King)). 
 215. Id. at 2434. 
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matter of conscience cannot be successfully legislated”216 and that 
enforcement of the terms of the legislation would amount to “sociological 
manipulation.”217 
Conservatives outside of Congress made similar arguments. George 
Wallace, for example, claimed that the legislation would “enslave our 
nation.”218 Wallace also asserted that the legislation “empower[ed] the 
United States government” to impose racial “quotas” upon employers, that 
it was “an act of tyranny,” and that it deprived whites of “human and 
property rights.”219 
D. A Chronic Fatigue Syndrome: Racial Exhaustion in Contemporary 
Civil Rights Discourse 
1. The End of the Second Reconstruction and Opposition to 
Affirmative Action 
Historically, opponents to racial egalitarian measures have portrayed 
such policies as redundant given prior legislation and societal 
commitments to antiracism, too extreme and overwhelming in terms of 
substance and duration; harmful to whites because they discriminate in 
reverse, invade whites’ individual rights, and make persons of color 
special favorites of the law; futile because they attempt to legislate matters 
beyond the law’s competence; and unnecessary because persons of color 
have ample opportunity to advance without additional legal protection and 
any barriers they face come from nonracial sources, such as poverty or 
lack of merit. These same rhetorical strategies have framed contemporary 
opposition to race-based remedies among lawmakers, the Supreme Court, 
countermovements to antiracism, and individual whites. 
After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, racial equality 
activists advocated for the enactment of affirmative measures designed to 
remedy the conditions of racial inequality.220 Opponents to affirmative 
action have often contested such measures in the same language used to 
oppose Reconstruction and 1960s civil rights measures. Supreme Court 
 
 
 216. Id. at 2173. 
 217. Id. at 2434. 
 218. George C. Wallace, The Civil Rights Movement: Fraud, Sham and Hoax (July 4, 1964), 
available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1964WALLACE.html (emphasis added). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Dennis Deslippe, “Do Whites Have Rights?”: White Detroit Policemen and “Reverse 
Discrimination” Protests in the 1970s, 91 J. AM. HIST. 932 (2004); see also Laura Kalman, Right Star 
Rising: American Politics and the Limits of Leadership in the Seventies, 1974–79 (on file with author).  
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jurisprudence has often mirrored public attitudes that resist affirmative 
action and that view such polices as unfair and unnecessary. Accordingly, 
this case law helps to document the persistence of racial exhaustion 
sentiment in contemporary race discourse and the role of the Court in 
enforcing dominant public opinion regarding race.  
In its affirmative action jurisprudence, the Court has expressed hostility 
and skepticism towards remedial race discrimination in cases challenging 
affirmative action.221 Court rulings have invalidated affirmative action 
policies after finding them excessive with respect to scope and duration.222 
The application of strict scrutiny to affirmative action provides a doctrinal 
framework for questioning the magnitude of affirmative action policies. 
By applying strict scrutiny, the Court considers whether the policies are 
narrowly tailored. Under this standard, the Court has demanded temporal 
and substantive constraints and has encouraged lawmakers to pursue 
remedies that distribute resources on grounds other than race.223 And while 
the Court has held that state actors can use race-based policies to remedy 
their own discrimination, Equal Protection jurisprudence prohibits race-
conscious policies designed to ameliorate the effects of private, or 
“societal discrimination.”224 Court doctrine views societal discrimination 
as “too vague, speculative, and potentially far-reaching to justify race 
conscious action.”225 The Court first expressed this view in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, which invalidated defendant’s usage of 
 
 
 221. See Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Inaction, 50 HOW. L.J. 611, 664 (2007) (discussing 
Court’s “hostility” to affirmative action). 
 222. Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1195, 1244–45 (2002) (“The Court has sometimes struck down affirmative action plans because 
their use of race to identify beneficiaries is overinclusive.”); id. at 1251 (discussing Court’s discomfort 
with open-ended affirmative action plans); Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781, 
1786 (1996) (“In considering the validity of affirmative action remedies for past discrimination, the 
Supreme Court’s primary concern has been overinclusion; that is, giving affirmative action preferences 
to people who were not affected by past discrimination”); Joel K. Goldstein, Justice O’Connor’s 
Twenty-Five Year Expectation: The Legitimacy of Durational Limits in Grutter, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 83, 
113–23 (2006) (discussing court’s discomfort with open-ended affirmative action plans). 
 223. See sources cited supra note 222 (discussing durational and substantive limits); see also 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1326 n.325 (2007) (“The 
necessity or narrow tailoring requirement may explain why the Supreme Court has demanded that a 
government body explore race-neutral alternatives before implementing an affirmative action plan.”). 
 224. Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race 
Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 2013 (2000) (“The Court has been adamant, for example, that the remedy 
of mere ‘societal discrimination’ is not a compelling state interest that justifies voluntary affirmative 
action programs.”); James Boyd White, What’s Wrong With Our Talk About Race? On History, 
Particularity, and Affirmative Action, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1927, 1943 (2002) (discussing doctrinal 
prohibition of affirmative action to remedy societal discrimination). 
 225. See Harris, supra note 224, at 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] RACIAL EXHAUSTION 955 
 
 
 
 
a racial quota to admit students.226 The Court held that remedies for 
societal discrimination are insufficiently “specific” or “focused” as a 
matter of constitutional law.227 Subsequently, in Wygant v. Jackson Board 
of Education, the Court invalidated an affirmative action policy that 
sought to preserve the number of teachers of color by insulating them from 
layoffs.228 The defendant justified the policy as remedying societal 
discrimination and providing role models for students of color.229 The 
Court rejected this justification, holding that: 
[A]s the basis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work 
against innocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient and 
over-expansive. In the absence of particularized findings, a court 
could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, 
and timeless in their ability to affect the future.230 
Furthermore, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,231 the Court 
reiterated its position that remedying societal discrimination would 
constitute an over-remedy: 
To accept Richmond’s claim that past societal discrimination alone 
can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open 
the door to competing claims for “remedial relief” for every 
disadvantaged group. The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a 
society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and 
achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based 
on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs.232 
Recent case law reiterates the Court’s discomfort with the ongoing usage 
of race-based affirmative action. In Grutter v. Bollinger, for example, the 
Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s consideration of 
race in its admissions policy in order to facilitate academic diversity.233 
Although the diversity rationale has enjoyed much more success than the 
 
 
 226. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 227. Id. at 307 (“In the school [desegregation] cases, the States were required by court order to 
redress the wrongs worked by specific instances of racial discrimination. That goal was far more 
focused than the remedying of the effects of ‘societal discrimination,’ an amorphous concept of injury 
that may be ageless in its reach into the past.”). 
 228. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
 229. See id. at 274. 
 230. Id. at 276. 
 231. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 232. Id. at 505–06. 
 233. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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remedial justification for affirmative action,234 Grutter nevertheless 
reaffirmed the Court’s skeptical stance towards affirmative action. In dicta 
concluding the majority opinion, the Court expressed a hope that 
affirmative action will soon cease to exist:  
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of 
race to further an interest in student body diversity in the context of 
public higher education. Since that time, the number of minority 
applicants with high grades and test scores has indeed increased. 
We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will 
no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.235 
Mirroring dominant public opinion, the Court also treats affirmative 
action as invidious “reverse discrimination” that harms whites.236 For 
example, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1,237 the Court’s most recent affirmative action ruling, the 
plurality equated the remedial usage of race with support for Jim Crow.238 
The application of strict scrutiny alone demonstrates the Court’s 
perception of affirmative action as an improper burden on whites, rather 
than a legal remedy for societal wrongs.239 Applying strict scrutiny in a 
symmetrical fashion implies that racism and affirmative action lack a 
moral or legal distinction.240 The Court’s ruling in Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena,241 for example, resolves prior debate on this issue and finds 
that “‘Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily 
 
 
 234. Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law and the 
New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 677 (2004) (“Today . . . affirmative 
action is increasingly being justified not as a remedy to historical discrimination and inequality, but as 
an instrumentally rational strategy used to achieve the positive effects of racial and gender diversity in 
modern society.”). 
 235. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. 
 236. Spann, supra note 221, at 646 (“[T]he Supreme Court has taught us that resistance to 
affirmative action is rooted in the need to prevent a new form of racial discrimination—the reverse 
discrimination that occurs when racial minorities abuse their subordinate social status to take 
advantage of innocent Whites.”). 
 237. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 238. See id. at 2767–68 (comparing ruling with the plaintiffs’ contention in Brown and 
disparaging race-based remedies as racial discrimination); see also id. at 2782–88 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 239. See Linda L. Holdeman, Civil Rights in Employment: The New Generation, 67 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 1, 47 (1990) (“The decision to apply strict scrutiny to remedial racial classification implicitly 
regards the past twenty-five years of affirmative action as similarly invidious and effectively equates 
the efforts of states to achieve racial equality with Jim Crow laws.”). 
 240. See Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 HOW. L.J. 1, 65 (1995) 
(“The Supreme Court has declined to treat motive as relevant in its affirmative action cases, thereby 
disregarding the only distinction that exists between affirmative action and discrimination.”). 
 241. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] RACIAL EXHAUSTION 957 
 
 
 
 
receive a most searching examination.’”242 The Court’s doctrine treats 
racially explicit state action with “consistency” and “skepticism” 
regardless of the purpose behind the policy.243 
Court doctrine absolutely prohibits racial quotas and other forms of 
affirmative action based on numerical assignment of benefits.244 The 
Bakke decision turned on the fact that the defendant utilized a quota 
system to admit students of color,245 and the Court derided the set-aside in 
Croson.246 Also, while Grutter validated the qualitative affirmative action 
plan the University of Michigan Law School utilized to admit students,247 
Gratz v. Bollinger248 struck down the undergraduate plan because it 
assigned a fixed number of points to students based on racial 
background.249 According to the Court, this scheme overemphasized 
race.250  
The Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence has also viewed with 
skepticism claims of racial injustice towards persons of color. In Croson, 
for example, the Court dismissed as “sheer speculation” the city’s claim 
that minority-owned businesses suffered from racial discrimination, thus 
warranting corrective measures.251 Richmond justified its affirmative plan 
with the following evidence: (1) minority-owned businesses received just 
.67% of prime contracts although blacks comprised 50% of the city’s 
population; (2) a congressional study found that racism impeded minority 
participation in the construction industry nationally; (3) municipal 
lawmakers attested to racial discrimination in the local contracting 
 
 
 242. Id. at 223 (emphasis added) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 
(1986) (plurality opinion)). 
 243. Id. at 223–24. 
 244. See Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 346, 376 (2003) 
(arguing that a majority of the Court has held that “quotas and mechanical formulas that award a 
certain number of points to all minority students are unconstitutional”). 
 245. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (“It may be assumed that 
the reservation of a specified number of seats in each class for individuals from the preferred ethnic 
groups would contribute to the attainment of considerable ethnic diversity in the student body. But 
petitioner’s argument that this is the only effective means of serving the interest of diversity is 
seriously flawed.”). 
 246. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (holding that “the 30% 
quota cannot be said to be narrowly tailored to any goal, except perhaps outright racial balancing”). 
 247. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 248. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 249. Id. at 270 (“We find that the University’s policy, which automatically distributes 20 points, 
or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single ‘underrepresented minority’ 
applicant solely because of race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity 
. . . .”). 
 250. Id. 
 251. Croson, 488 U.S. at 499. 
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industry; and (4) minority-owned businesses did not widely participate in 
state and local trade associations.252 In Bakke, the Court portrays societal 
discrimination as an “amorphous concept of injury” that seemingly does 
not injure persons of color in any concrete or measurable way.253 
Consequently, Court doctrine has attempted to discount invidious 
explanations for racially disparate state action. In Croson, for example, the 
Court held that “[m]any of the barriers to minority participation in the 
construction industry relied upon by the city to justify a racial 
classification appear to be race neutral.”254 The Court’s reluctance to view 
race as a contemporary barrier to economic opportunity mirrors 
majoritarian public opinion; it also follows the same historical logic that 
opponents to racial egalitarianism have consistently advanced to contest 
and dismiss the importance of race-based remedies.  
2. Requiring “Discriminatory Intent” 
The discriminatory intent rule, a highly criticized doctrine, requires 
equal protection plaintiffs to demonstrate that the governmental defendant 
engaged in purposeful discrimination.255 To satisfy this standard, plaintiffs 
typically must provide direct evidence of defendants’ intent, and the Court 
has declined to find discrimination even in circumstances where facially 
neutral state action leads to highly disparate effects burdening women and 
persons of color.256 The intent rule, like the affirmative action doctrine, 
treats racism as aberrational or nonexistent, and the Court strives to rebut 
invidious explanations for racially disparate state action. 
In Washington v. Davis, for example, the Court refused to treat the 
police department’s aptitude test, which disparately excluded black 
applicants, as racially discriminatory.257 Instead, the Court suggested that 
the applicants’ own lack of merit, rather than race, excluded them from the 
force: “[I]t is untenable that the Constitution prevents the Government 
from seeking modestly to upgrade the communicative abilities of its 
employees rather than to be satisfied with some lower level of 
competence, particularly where the job requires special ability to 
 
 
 252. See id. at 499–500. 
 253. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978). 
 254. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507. 
 255. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race”: The 
Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 
615, 662–68 (discussing precedent and scholarship related to the intent rule). 
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 257. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] RACIAL EXHAUSTION 959 
 
 
 
 
communicate orally and in writing.”258 But the Court never scrutinizes 
whether the test modestly improved the police force and instead defers to 
the defendant’s assertion.259 The Court also declines to consider whether 
the police department could have used less discriminatory means to 
improve the force.260 More importantly,261 Davis announces an intent 
standard for Equal Protection litigation that has imposed extraordinary 
burdens for plaintiffs attempting to prove racial and gender 
discrimination.262  
Similarly, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., the Court declined to find that racial discrimination 
led an almost all-white Chicago suburb to deny a zoning variance to a 
builder of low income housing.263 The Court held that the city merely 
discriminated on the basis of the type of housing petitioner wanted to 
build, rather than the race of the builder’s potential tenants.264 Despite 
finding that the debates over the project included vocal discussion of “the 
desirability or undesirability of introducing . . . in Arlington Heights low- 
and moderate-income housing . . . that would probably be racially 
integrated,”265 the Court found that the ultimate denial of the variance 
lacked racist motivation.266 
Moreover, in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court sustained the Georgia 
death penalty, despite the fact that an extensive study suggested that race 
determined whether prosecutors and jurors favored the imposition of 
capital punishment.267 Although the Court described the study as 
“sophisticated,”268 McCleskey was unsuccessful because he failed to offer 
 
 
 258. Id. at 245–46. 
 259. Id. at 237–39 (declining to scrutinize the validity of the test as an indicator of employee 
fitness). 
 260. See Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the 
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 999–1000 (1993) (advocating reforming 
Equal Protection doctrine to allow plaintiffs to propose less discriminatory means to pursue legitimate 
state objectives). 
 261. Many progressive scholars concede that Davis is a difficult case. See, e.g., id. at 1001 
(describing Davis as “challenging” even under the author’s flexible standard). 
 262. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1113 
(1989) (“Given this standard of specific intent, evidence of disparate effect proves of little help to 
plaintiffs.”); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1135 (1997) (arguing that the Court has “defined 
discriminatory purpose in terms that are extraordinarily difficult to prove”). 
 263. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 264. Id. at 269–70. 
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 267. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 268. Id. at 286. 
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“evidence specific to his own case that would support an inference that 
racial considerations played a part in his sentence.”269 Having dismissed 
the operation of race in McCleskey’s sentence, the Court held that penalty 
rested on a “legitimate and unchallenged explanation . . . : [he] committed 
an act for which the United States Constitution and Georgia laws permit 
imposition of the death penalty.”270 But this fact cannot substantiate 
unequal and racially discriminatory application of the death penalty 
statute.271 
The intent rule tracks racial exhaustion in yet another way: this 
doctrine treats racial remedies as excessive and burdensome. The Court 
often justifies the requirement of discriminatory intent using slippery slope 
arguments. If the Court were to credit impact data as probative of intent, 
its doctrine would imperil a host of facially neutral laws that disadvantage 
persons of color. Judicial invalidation of racially disparate laws, in the 
absence of smoking-gun evidence of racially discriminatory motivation, 
would therefore constitute an over-remedy and would unduly burden the 
operation of governments. In Davis, for example, the Court held that  
 A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is 
nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it 
benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far-
reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps 
invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, 
and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and 
to the average black than to the more affluent white.272 
And in McCleskey, the Court held that flexibility in its application of the 
intent rule would have a catastrophic impact on criminal law enforcement. 
The Court favored a more limited approach because: 
[T]aken to its logical conclusion, [McCleskey’s claim] throws into 
serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal 
justice system. . . . [I]f we accepted McCleskey’s claim that racial 
bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we 
 
 
 269. Id. at 292–93. 
 270. Id. at 297. 
 271. See id. at 348 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The Court on numerous occasions during the past 
century has recognized that an otherwise legitimate basis for a conviction does not outweigh an equal 
protection violation. In cases where racial discrimination in the administration of the criminal justice 
system is established, it has held that setting aside the conviction is the appropriate remedy.”). Cf. 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“We of course agree with petitioners that the 
Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.”). 
 272. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). 
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could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty. 
Moreover, the claim that his sentence rests on the irrelevant factor 
of race easily could be extended to apply to claims based on 
unexplained discrepancies that correlate to membership in other 
minority groups, and even to gender. Similarly, since McCleskey’s 
claim relates to the race of his victim, other claims could apply with 
equally logical force to statistical disparities that correlate with the 
race or sex of other actors in the criminal justice system, such as 
defense attorneys or judges. Also, there is no logical reason that 
such a claim need be limited to racial or sexual bias. . . . [S]uch a 
claim could—at least in theory—be based upon any arbitrary 
variable, such as the defendant’s facial characteristics, or the 
physical attractiveness of the defendant or the victim, that some 
statistical study indicates may be influential in jury decisionmaking. 
As these examples illustrate, there is no limiting principle to the 
type of challenge brought by McCleskey. The Constitution does not 
require that a State eliminate any demonstrable disparity that 
correlates with a potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a 
criminal justice system that includes capital punishment.273 
Accepting arbitrariness in the enforcement of criminal law as inevitable, 
the Court characterized potential remedies for such discrimination as 
threatening to the “entire criminal justice system.”274 The prospect of 
remedying racial disparities seems to overwhelm the Court; or as Justice 
Brennan states in his dissent, the Court’s logic “seems to suggest a fear of 
too much justice.”275 
The Court has also justified adherence to a rigid intent standard on the 
grounds that a more flexible rule could lead to quotas or reverse 
discrimination against whites. Accordingly, Court doctrine in this context 
mirrors majoritarian distrust of civil rights remedies and claims of 
injustice. In early Title VII cases, for example, the Court treated disparate 
impact evidence as probative of unlawful discrimination.276 The 
conservative Rehnquist Court, however, would later abandon this 
approach and toughen the evidentiary burden required of plaintiffs. The 
Court announced its more exacting standard in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
 
 
 273. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 314–19 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
 274. See id. at 315. 
 275. Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 276. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427–28, 436 (1971) (invalidating facially 
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Atonio.277 The Court concluded that a flexible rule would cause employers 
to adopt hiring quotas, thus discriminating against whites:  
The Court of Appeals’ theory, at the very least, would mean that 
any employer who had a segment of his work force that was—for 
some reason—racially imbalanced, could be hauled into court and 
forced to engage in the expensive and time-consuming task of 
defending the “business necessity” of the methods used to select the 
other members of his work force. The only practicable option for 
many employers would be to adopt racial quotas, insuring that no 
portion of their work forces deviated in racial composition from the 
other portions thereof. . . . The Court of Appeals’ theory would 
“leave the employer little choice . . . but to engage in a subjective 
quota system of employment selection.”278 
Following criticism from civil rights advocates, Congress overruled Wards 
Cove in 1991,279 but only after President Bush vetoed and characterized a 
prior version as a “quota bill.”280 The conservative opposition to this 
legislation provides another example of the way in which political rhetoric 
frames civil rights measures as invidious discrimination. 
3. Contemporary Civil Rights Legislative Debates and Racial 
Exhaustion 
a. Civil Rights Act of 1990 
Racial exhaustion has also framed contemporary legislative debates 
over racial justice initiatives. Members of Congress and the President have 
characterized antidiscrimination measures as redundant and unfair to 
whites. In 1990, for example, Congress drafted legislation that would have 
reversed Court doctrine that civil rights advocates widely viewed as 
impeding the ability of Title VII plaintiffs to prove cases of 
discrimination.281 President Bush fulfilled a promise to veto the legislation, 
 
 
 277. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 278. Id. at 652 (quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring)). 
 279. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
 280. See Steven A. Holmes, Vowing to Veto Rights Bill, President Offers Alternative, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 21, 1990, § 1, at 22. 
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1989, at E1 (“Lawyers representing blacks and women in job discrimination suits said the Wards Cove 
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and his veto message invoked the language of racial quotas.282 He argued 
that the proposed legislation would lead to quotas, despite the fact that in 
anticipation of his veto, the bill’s proponents inserted language stating that 
the legislation would not mandate the implementation of quotas.283 
Nonetheless, Bush employed the same logic applied in the Court decision 
that the Congress sought to overturn. Bush argued that the legislation: 
[C]reates powerful incentives for employers to adopt hiring and 
promotion quotas. These incentives are created by the bill’s new 
and very technical rules of litigation, which will make it difficult for 
employers to defend legitimate employment practices. In many 
cases, a defense against unfounded allegations will be impossible. 
Among other problems, the plaintiff often need not even show that 
any of the employer’s practices caused a significant statistical 
disparity. . . . [U]nable to defend legitimate practices in court, 
employers will be driven to adopt quotas in order to avoid 
liability.284 
Members of Congress made similar arguments. Senator Dole declared that 
the bill would result in “quotas, quotas and more employment quotas.”285 
And Senator Seymour argued that the legislation would have led to 
“people being hired and promoted primarily on ethnic group membership, 
not individual merit.”286 
Opponents also asserted that the legislation created special privileges 
for persons of color. Senator Helms, for example, argued that the pending 
legislation rests on a “vision . . . of . . . America stratified by racial and 
ethnic quotas—an America whose law codifies the system where benefits 
and advantages are doled out according to group identity rather than on 
merit and the content of character.”287 Senator Helms’ assertions, along 
with the quota language of the other opponents, track the rhetorical 
opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the project of 
 
 
 282. 136 CONG. REC. S31827–28 (1990) (veto statement). 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at S31828. 
 285. Neil Lewis, President’s Veto of Rights Measure Survives by 1 Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
1990, at A1. 
 286. 137 CONG. REC. 28,718 (1991) (statement of Sen. Seymour); see also 136 CONG. REC. 
H6798 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Bartlett); 136 CONG. REC. S9817 (daily ed. July 17, 
1990) (statement of Sen. Coats); 136 CONG. REC. S9339–40 (daily ed. July 10, 1990) (statement of 
Sen. Thurmond); 136 CONG. REC. S3144 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 287. 136 CONG. REC. S16562 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Sen. Helms). 
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Reconstruction.288 Racial exhaustion remains a rhetorical tool of 
opponents to racial egalitarianism. 
b. Voting Rights Act Reauthorization 
Another recent legislative debate that generated arguments over racial 
egalitarian remedies concerned the appropriateness of reauthorizing 
Section Five of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.289 Section Five requires 
that several states, listed in the statute, with a long history of voter 
disenfranchisement, must have any changes in their state election and 
voting laws precleared by the Department of Justice or by the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia.290 The preclearance 
process seeks to ensure that the proposed changes would not abridge the 
rights of voters of color.291  
Voting rights advocates have heralded the preclearance provision as 
one of the most effective tools of civil rights enforcement and racial 
egalitarianism, and they also view it as the first substantial legislative 
effort to enforce constitutionally protected voting rights of persons of 
color.292 Although blacks could minimally exercise their right to vote in 
parts of the South during Reconstruction (and this still brought about much 
violence), after the end of Reconstruction and the removal of troops from 
the South, blacks subsequently lost their ability to vote.293 Between 1872 
and 1965, virtually all southern blacks were disenfranchised.294 
 
 
 288. See supra text accompanying notes 73–87, 190–219. 
 289. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). 
 290. See id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. See Hugh Davis Graham, Voting Rights and the American Regulatory State, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 177, 177 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) 
(characterizing the Voting Rights Act as “one of the most effective instruments of social legislation in 
the modern era of American reform”); Adam Cox & Thomas Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008) (“The Voting Rights Act has dramatically reshaped the political 
landscape of the United States. In the four decades since its enactment, it has helped substantially 
expand political opportunities for minority voters and has contributed to the radical realignment of 
southern politics.”); Daniel P. Tokaji, If It’s Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance, 
49 HOW. L.J. 785, 785 (2006) (“There can be no question that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 . . . has 
been extremely effective in removing barriers to participation in the democratic process by people of 
color. It is also clear that aggressive enforcement of the [statute] has increased the number of racial 
minorities elected to office, integrating legislative bodies that were formerly all White.”). 
 293. See Tokaji, supra note 292, at 790–91 (observing that “[b]y the turn of the 20th Century, 
virtually all African Americans in the South were denied the right to vote” and that their 
disenfranchisement persisted “throughout the deep South until the enactment of the VRA in 1965”). 
 294. Id. at 791. 
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Prior to the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, southern states 
routinely excluded blacks from exercising the franchise through a host of 
practices including outright physical intimidation and racial terror, literacy 
and knowledge tests, discretionary character assessments, and poll 
taxes.295 The Voting Rights Act eliminated these practices and provided 
that preclearance requirement would remain effective for a five-year 
period.296 After successive intervening renewals, Section Five would have 
expired in 2007 absent congressional reauthorization.297 The renewal of 
Section Five sparked heated discourse concerning the vulnerability of 
persons of color to disenfranchisement and the need for remedial 
measures. 
Historically, lawmakers and scholars have widely supported renewals 
to the statute. The 2007 discussion, however, split commentators.298 Many 
of the arguments used by opponents of reauthorization employ the themes 
of racial exhaustion that this Article has detailed. Some members of 
Congress, for example, argued that preclearance had outlived its 
usefulness because the southern states no longer intend to disenfranchise 
blacks.299 Additionally, some lawmakers expressed concerns about the 
prospective durational scope of the legislation.300 
Outside of Congress, conservative political commentators Abigail 
Thernstrom and Edward Blum urged Congress to “do the right thing” and 
let Section Five expire.301 Thernstrom and her husband, Stephan 
 
 
 295. See Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1711 (2004) (“Beginning in the period of ‘Redemption’ at the end of the 
19th century, literacy tests, poll taxes, restricted access to registration, and other such mechanisms had 
been the hallmarks of the disenfranchisement of the post-Civil War South’s black population.”); 
Tokaji, supra note 292, at 790 (“In the 1870s . . . the number of Blacks declined dramatically, and in 
subsequent decades Blacks throughout the South were denied the right to vote through a variety of 
exclusionary measures including literacy tests, property qualifications, criminal disenfranchisement, 
and White primaries.”); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310–11 (1966) 
(rejecting constitutional challenge to Voting Rights Act of 1965 and detailing list of southern practices 
designed to prevent blacks from voting). 
 296. See John Michael Elden, Note, The Case for Reauthorizing Section Five of the Voting Rights 
Act, 55 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1183–84 (2006). 
 297. Id. 
 298. Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In 
Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 709 (2006) (“After a long period of relative unanimity, the 
academics who study the Act and the lawyers who enforce it are at an impasse . . . .”). 
 299. Carl Hulse, Rebellion Stalls Extension of Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2006, at 
A3. 
 300. “I continue to have some serious concerns with several aspects of it’ including its ‘extension 
for an extraordinary 25 years.’” Charles Babington, Voting Rights Act Extension Passes in Senate, 98 
to 0, WASH. POST, July 21, 2006, at A01 (quoting Sen. Chambliss) (emphasis added). 
 301. Abigail Thernstrom & Edward Blum, Do the Right Thing, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2005, at 
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Thernstrom, have spent a lot of intellectual energy attempting to disprove 
the existence of racism in contemporary United States society.302 
Thernstrom joins Blum to contest reauthorization, and their arguments rely 
heavily on racial exhaustion rhetoric. First, Thernstrom and Blum argue 
that the provision is unnecessary because “[t]imes have changed.”303 They 
argue that blacks are no longer endangered by southern racism because the 
Voting Rights Act has been “amazingly effective.”304 They also assert that 
Section Five is too burdensome a remedy. They describe the remedial 
provision as a “Draconian federal intrusion into local elections” and a 
“radical penalty” for “wrongs” of the past.305 Doubting the continued 
vulnerability of southern black voters to invidious state action, the authors 
advocate an alternative approach that would require individual voters to 
prove on a case-by-case basis how a proposed modification in state 
election law would harm minority voters.306 This logic echoes the Court’s 
affirmative action jurisprudence which permits race-based remedies only 
upon a showing of discrete and particularized acts of injustice.307 Finally, 
Thernstrom and Blum depict the civil rights remedy as a special handout 
and favor to blacks and other persons of color. They assert that Congress 
capitulated to “Jesse Jackson and other activists eager to wave the racism 
flag” and that congressional Republicans are “terrified by . . . the NAACP, 
the Lawyers Committee on Civil Rights, and other advocacy groups.”308 
Although scholars have raised some legitimate concerns regarding the 
potentially partisan nature of preclearance and the constitutionality of the 
provision in light of recent Supreme Court rulings,309 many of the 
arguments nonetheless rest on the unsubstantiated and historically 
persistent notion that racism no longer exists and are thus part of a broader 
social narrative that disputes the ongoing relevance of race.310 Some voting 
rights scholars made similar arguments.311 
 
 
 302. See, e.g., STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND 
WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE (1999) (exhaustive analysis of improvements in race relation that 
obviate need for race-based remedies). 
 303. Thernstrom & Blum, supra note 301. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. (favoring an approach where “the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs”). 
 307. See supra text accompanying notes 224–32. 
 308. Thernstrom & Blum, supra note 301. 
 309. See Tokaji, supra note 292, at 785–89 (listing legal and political controversies surrounding 
preclearance). 
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IV. ADVOCATING RACIAL INEQUALITY IN A RACIALLY EXHAUSTED 
SOCIETY 
An historical review of race equality discourse reveals a set of 
arguments employed trans-historically to contest racial egalitarian legal 
proposals as unnecessary or inappropriate, given an exacting, yet 
successful, societal effort to root out and repair the conditions of racial 
inequality; too expansive in substantive scope or duration of the measures; 
futile, in light of the inability of law to alter social relations; misguided 
because racially identifiable inequality results from pathological behavior 
or class barriers; and unfair because they constitute a special handout to 
people of color or otherwise injure whites. This rhetoric has framed 
opposition to racial redress as early as Reconstruction, and it has 
maintained a role in legal and political debates over race through the 
middle-twentieth century and in contemporary United States politics. The 
remainder of this Article discusses (1) why this rhetoric has a persistent 
role in racial debates; (2) how recognition of the historical use of this 
rhetoric to contest racial justice might impact the way social movement 
actors frame their political agendas and construct their engagement with 
countermovements; and (3) how the research presented in this Article 
could provide alternative approaches to contemporary racial equality 
doctrine.  
A. Longevity of Racial Exhaustion 
There are at least two general reasons for the persistence of racial 
exhaustion rhetoric.  
1. Exhaustion Rhetoric Often Raises Legitimate Policy Questions 
Exhaustion rhetoric exists pervasively because many of the themes in 
this discourse relate to legitimate policy questions. It is not unreasonable 
for policymakers and the public to question the factual basis for legislation 
or try to preserve resources by placing time and substantive limits around 
 
 
of nine days after this essay was published, Obama lost three primaries and won two; three of those 
contests—Texas, Ohio, and Mississippi—revealed extremely sharp racial divisions among voters. See 
Alan Fram, Poll: Whites Back Clinton in TX, OH, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2008, at A1; Robert D. 
Novack, How Race Divides the Democrats, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2008, at A17 (discussing racial 
polarization among Democrats).  
 311. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 295 (arguing against reauthorization on the grounds that 
blacks no longer face substantial obstacles to voting, the process burdens states, other parts of the 
statute effectively protect blacks, and the Department of Justice can engage in partisan preclearance). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
968 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:917 
 
 
 
 
regulatory measures. Also, questioning whether a proposed policy or 
doctrinal approach is redundant or ineffective seems well within the range 
of reasoned discourse. In addition, considering whether a proposed 
measure will create unforeseen externalities could also fairly influence 
legal debates. Finally, if a law represents a naked preference or political 
patronage, then public opinion could have a legitimate role in determining 
its desirability. For all of these reasons, many of the issues raised by racial 
exhaustion rhetoric seem justifiable as rational elements of policy 
discourse.312 
That many of these themes are common to policy debates does not 
make studying their advancement in racial discourse unhelpful. First, 
taken together, these arguments do more than raise reasonable policy 
concerns. Instead, they portray a social narrative that disputes the 
existence of racism and substantial racial barriers—even at a period in 
United States history when racial justice efforts were embryonic and the 
status of persons of color extremely vulnerable. Questioning the existence 
of racism is a valid inquiry, but assuming its nonexistence across 
generations suggests disingenuousness or lack of social knowledge among 
some opponents to civil rights. Accordingly, while this set of arguments 
might raise valid concerns, they have helped advance a discourse that 
denies the oppression of persons of color and legitimates material 
inequality that corresponds with race.313 Also, many of these policy 
arguments can mask biases or otherwise help to facilitate subjugation. In 
the context of racial justice, for example, southern states have historically 
advanced states’ rights arguments in political debates, including their 
defense of slavery and their resistance to legal and political efforts to 
dismantle Jim Crow.314 Thus, in terms of impact, racial exhaustion rhetoric 
has been an instrument used to resist racial progress, rather than simply 
map out the reasonable contours of social policy. 
 
 
 312. This probably explains in large part the persistence of racial exhaustion rhetoric and the 
difficulty of moving beyond it. 
 313. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, 
FUTILITY, JEOPARDY (1991) (discussing repetitive arguments that seek to legitimate social 
disadvantage). 
 314. Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1306–07 (1999) 
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invoked states’ rights in an effort to preserve first slavery and then segregation.”); Paul Finkelman, 
Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C. L. REV. 77, 99 (1985) (“Slavery and racial segregation . . . 
were the chief motivations for the doctrines of states’ rights and state sovereignty . . . .”). 
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2. Inter-Group Struggle 
Psychologists have also examined the extent to which “principled” 
opposition to antiegalitarian social policy arises from an effort to justify 
and preserve group dominance.315 In societies with “group-based 
hierarchies” politics can represent “intergroup competition over scarce 
material and symbolic resources.”316 In such societies, political ideology 
provides a rhetorical frame to “legitimize each group’s claims” for these 
social resources.317 During Reconstruction, many of the members of 
Congress who opposed racial redress actually mixed their race-neutral 
arguments concerning the role of the national government and the 
appropriateness of aid to the poor with blatant appeals to group 
domination and to white supremacy.318 Over time, blatantly racist elements 
of political discourse resisting egalitarianism have subsided, likely because 
a majority of the public now staunchly disapproves of expressions of white 
supremacist ideology.319 Nevertheless, opponents to race equality 
measures continue to cast such initiatives in terms of group impact, 
particularly when they argue that civil rights measures privilege persons of 
color and harm whites.320 Indeed, some contemporary psychological 
studies have found that individual opposition to race-based remedies, such 
as affirmative action, often correlates strongly with “classical racism” (or a 
belief in the superiority of whites) and a desire for in-group dominance.321 
 
 
 315. See, e.g., Lawrence Bobo, Felicia Pratto & Jim Sidanius, Racism, Conservatism, Affirmative 
Action, and Intellectual Sophistication: A Matter of Principled Conservatism or Group Dominance?, 
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 316. Id. at 477. 
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 318. See supra text accompanying notes 53–93. 
 319. Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal 
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with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322–23 (1987) (“[T]he human mind defends itself 
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racism as immoral. When an individual experiences conflict between racist ideas and the societal ethic 
that condemns those ideas, the mind excludes his racism from consciousness.”). 
 320. See text accompanying supra notes 279–88 (discussing argument that civil rights harms 
whites). 
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dominance] were strongly related to affirmative action attitudes . . . .”); Lawrence Bobo & James 
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Viewed in the context of this psychological literature, racial exhaustion 
rhetoric can be seen as permitting whites to protect group interests, 
legitimate the material conditions of racial inequality, and resolve deep 
contradictions between social norms favoring equal opportunity and 
justice and the vastly unequal social and economic status between persons 
of color and whites.322 
B. Implications for Social Movement Actors 
Countermovements to racial justice have effectively narrated a portrait 
of the United States as post-racist and egalitarian. They have also 
persuasively described racially egalitarian measures as unfair to whites. 
This political rhetoric has colored judicial opinions as well. Typically, 
antiracist social movement actors respond to these claims by arguing that 
effects of prior injustice shape inequality today, that racism still exists, and 
that these factors warrant corrective measures.323 These are logical 
responses. Yet, social movement actors might want to consider two other 
potential framing techniques: (1) they could demonstrate how arguments 
asserting the eradication of racism have been deployed throughout United 
States history in order to resist racial progress; and (2) given the potency 
of exhaustion rhetoric, they could strategically frame race issues in an 
alternative language, such as class or human rights, in order to engender 
broader public support.  
1. Protracted Resistance 
Social movement actors could contest the assumption that the United 
States has engaged in a sustained effort to eradicate racial injustice. An 
historical analysis of debates concerning racial justice reveals that 
opponents to racial justice have resisted racial progress using arguments 
that mirror those of opponents to racial egalitarianism today. Because 
many political variables will determine the successfulness of social 
movement strategy, using historical rhetoric to confront the premise of 
 
 
80 (arguing that “whites’ opposition to race-based policy . . . is fundamentally a way of opposing 
racial progress and defending their racial interests”). 
 322. See Bonilla-Silva, Lewis & Embrick, supra note 33, at 560 (“[T]oday few whites subscribe to 
the classical ideas of Jim Crowism . . . . [But] . . . these changes do not signify the ‘end of racism’. . . . 
Instead . . . racial prejudice . . . is expressed in a ‘subtle,’ modern,’ or ‘symbolic’ way . . . .”). 
 323. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative 
Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1455–57 (2005) (discussing “distributive justice” defense of 
affirmative action); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1782–84 (1993) 
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racial exhaustion rhetoric might not necessarily benefit antiracist social 
movements. Nevertheless, the historical research contained in this Article 
could provide the basis for rethinking and reforming social movement 
frames that promote racial egalitarian measures. And given the persistence 
of racial exhaustion rhetoric, attention to this particular frame seems 
reasonable. 
2. From Race to Class: Strategic Racial Exhaustion 
Given the popularity of the belief that the racial inequality results from 
nonracial factors, social movement actors could consider strategically 
framing their advocacy around class-based remedies. Indeed, many 
commentators have advocated this approach. Many scholars have 
advocated class-based agendas, on the grounds that they more directly 
address material inequity, present fewer problems politically given the 
opposition to race-conscious state action, and would likely survive judicial 
review because economic discrimination receives only rational basis 
review.324 Because successful social movements must take political 
opportunities into account as they tailor their advocacy,325 the rhetoric of 
racial exhaustion might compel them to reformulate their agendas on 
nonracial grounds. Nevertheless, this approach has two potential problems. 
First, sociological research has cautioned against efforts to extricate race 
and poverty. Although poor people have very similar experiences with 
social inequality, poor people of color tend to live in racially segregated 
areas of concentrated poverty, which tends to present unique problems, 
including remote isolation from quality schools and access to jobs.326 The 
intersection of race and poverty might require remedies that class-based 
agendas cannot effectuate. Also, pursuing antipoverty agendas can often 
provoke public hostility and countermovements can reframe these policies 
as handouts to persons of color. For example, opponents to welfare 
programs have often depicted welfare recipients in sexist and racist 
language in order to advocate the repeal or dramatic limitation of these 
 
 
 324. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA 
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policies (in terms of substance and duration).327 Furthermore, many 
scholars have cautioned that the Court might treat as invidious 
discrimination race-neutral policies that disparately benefit persons of 
color and which were clearly designed to evade application of strict 
judicial scrutiny.328 Finally, public opinion disfavors antipoverty policies 
which many people view as handouts to persons who lack initiative.329 
Accordingly, pursuing nonracial agendas could also only generate minimal 
success for antiracist social movements and provide limited benefits. 
C. Implications for Equality Doctrine 
This research could also provide the basis for contesting the Court’s 
equality doctrine. As political science scholarship would predict, the 
Court’s jurisprudence mirrors a public script that depicts the United States 
as a post-racist society and which views with suspicion governmental 
efforts to remedy racial inequality. As a result, the Court treats patterns of 
racial discrimination caused by facially neutral policies as presumptively 
constitutional and requires governmental entities to produce exacting 
evidence of their own discrimination before implementing race-based 
remedial measures. 
The Court’s equality doctrine deploys all of the elements of racial 
exhaustion rhetoric. But the historical persistence of this rhetoric should 
lead the Court to approach race-based remedies with greater flexibility and 
to take a tougher stance toward facially neutral state action that disparately 
harms persons of color. In its affirmative action jurisprudence, the Court 
justifies applying strict scrutiny to invidious and remedial usages of race 
on the grounds that the long history of racism warrants an invasive 
analysis to “‘smoke out’” impermissible purposes.330 The Court’s doctrine, 
however, rests on an incomplete portrait of history. The United States 
undeniably has a long history of racial subjugation, but during that history, 
opponents to racial egalitarianism have contested the existence of racism 
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and the need for remedial measures. The historical denial of racism is just 
as traditional as racism itself. Court doctrine, however, aligns itself with a 
tradition that doubts racial injustice. By effectively immunizing from 
judicial invalidation facially neutral state action that harms persons of 
color, the Court assumes that racism does not generally explain pervasive 
disparities that correlate with race. Similarly, by resisting the usage of 
race-based policies to remedy measurable inequality, the Court again 
situates itself within a rhetorical opposition to racial justice, which, from 
Reconstruction to the present, has contested racial remedies on the 
grounds that they are unnecessary, excessive, burdensome, futile, and 
unfair to whites. If the Court structures its equality doctrine to avoid 
abuses of the past, then it should reconsider its skepticism concerning the 
permissibility of policies that seek to ameliorate the conditions of racial 
inequality. Otherwise the Court risks taking an active role in legitimizing 
racial subordination and constraining remedies for racial injustice. 
Because the Court tends to reflect public opinion in its rulings,331 it is 
unlikely that it will dramatically alter its equality jurisprudence in the 
absence of a broad shift in dominant popular opinion which views racial 
egalitarian policies as unjust and unwarranted.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Concerted political and legal efforts to remedy the impact of slavery 
for free persons began shortly after emancipation. During the earliest 
debates over racial equality, opponents challenged racial egalitarian legal 
measures using a collection of arguments that have endured throughout 
United States history and that remain a central way in which 
countermovements, institutional political actors, and the Court contest 
racial remedies today. Specifically, the opposition to Reconstruction 
argued that various legal protections for blacks were unnecessary because 
preexisting measures had cured their vulnerability; the proposed measures 
were excessive in terms of substantive scope or duration; the laws made 
blacks special favorites and treated whites unfairly; racial inequality 
results from nondiscriminatory variables such as individual ineptness or 
class barriers; and that the laws could not remedy racial inequality. As 
domestic and international events would later provide political 
opportunities for progressive evolution in racial ideology, these arguments 
would continue to frame resistance to racial egalitarianism, particularly 
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following World War II, during the 1960s, and in the late twentieth 
century when contentious debates over affirmative action erupted. Today, 
these arguments narrate a dominant vision about the status of race 
relations. While a substantial majority of persons of color believe that race 
and racism remain relevant forces in shaping their social and economic 
status, whites tend to view race as an insignificant barrier to equal 
opportunity and attribute racial inequality to nonracial factors, like 
individual merit or poverty. As a large body of political science and 
constitutional law scholarship predicts, the Supreme Court’s racial 
equality jurisprudence has persistently mirrored white social opinion with 
respect to race. The Court stood in the way of Reconstruction, failed to 
remedy many of the most severe limits on black voting rights during the 
Progressive Era, and has constrained the impact of 1960s activism for 
racial justice by immunizing racially disparate, but facially neutral, state 
action from constitutional invalidation and by simultaneously subjecting 
race-based equality measures to the highest level of judicial scrutiny, 
questioning their necessity, and depicting them as injurious to whites. Far 
from acting as a countermajoritarian protector of subjugated minority 
interests, the Court enforces majoritarian viewpoints by dismissing racism 
as an insignificant social impediment.  
Social movements could use this research and respond to racial 
exhaustion rhetoric by showing its historical usage as an instrument of 
racial domination. Nevertheless, given the potency of this discourse, 
antiracist activists should consider reframing their advocacy in nonracial 
terms. This research also implicates Court doctrine, and it could help 
delegitimize the discriminatory intent and colorblindness rules. Although 
the Court justifies applying strict scrutiny to all race-conscious policies 
with references to the horrible history of racial subjugation, it fails to 
appreciate the equally long history of denying the existence of racial 
injustice and resisting racial egalitarian measures, which its jurisprudence 
perpetuates. Deconstructing and responding to racial exhaustion rhetoric 
could ultimately form the basis for modified social movement activity and 
interaction with institutional political actors and the courts. 
 
